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INTRODUCTION 
As the number of babies with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
[hereinafter AIDS] or Human Immunodeficiency Virus [hereinafter HIV] in-
fection rises, people question the right of HIV-infected women to bear chil-
dren. This Article focuses on the reproductive freedom issues that arise in the 
context of AIDS and HIV infection in pregnant women and women of 
childbearing age. Policies to screen for and counsel pregnant women and wo-
men of childbearing age about HIV infection present enormous possibilities 
for abuse through involuntary testing and directive counseling to abort or to 
be sterilized. The issue of health policies for fertile women with AIDS or HIV 
infection is complicated by the fact that most women currently identified as at 
risk in the United States are poor and/or women of color. 
It is estimated that nationwide, more than seventy percent of women with 
AIDS are African-American or Latina. 1 Public health policies directed to-
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ward fertile women with AIDS/HIV are and will be influenced by the fact 
that most HIV-infected women are poor women of color. Poor women of 
color most often receive their health care through government provided or 
funded facilities. Because these facilities are most likely to deal repeatedly 
with HIV -infected pregnant women, women of childbearing age, and babies, 
they will be the institutions developing and implementing HIV screening and 
counseling programs for women. This Article examines potential testing and 
counseling methodologies to be used in public institutions, and tests them for 
conformance with current equal protection and privacy constitutional 
standards. 
I. 
MEDICAL BACKGROUND AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES 
Women usually transmit or become infected with HIV in one of two 
ways: heterosexual contact2 or intravenous drug use (by sharing dirty need-
and Hispanics, 19 J. NAT'L MED. Ass'N 921, 922 {1988) {black women account for 49% of 
adult female cases, white women account for 30%, and Hispanic women 21 %); Curran, Jaffe, 
Hardy, Morgan, Selik & Dondero, Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United 
States, 239 SciENCE 610, 611 (1988) [hereinafter Epidemiology of HIV]. 
In 1988, African-American women between the ages of 15 and 44 were approximately nine 
times more likely to die from HIV I AIDS than white women of the same age. Chu, Buehler & 
Berkelman, Impact of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic on Mortality in Women of 
Reproductive Age, United States, 264 J. A.M.A. 225, 226 (1990) [hereinafter Impact of HIV on 
Women]. In 1987, AIDS was the eighth leading cause of death among women of reproductive 
age in the United States. The number of cases among women is increasing. If this trend contin-
ues, HIV I AIDS will be one of the five leading causes of death for women between 15 and 44 
years of age by 1991. Id. at 229. 
Initially, it was the policy of the Centers for Disease Control [hereinafter CDC] to report 
incidence of AIDS in the Asian, native American, and Pacific Islander communities collectively 
as "Other''. This practice, which masked the impact of AIDS upon these communities, has 
been criticized by minority researchers and by the Final Report of the Secretary's Task Force 
on Black and Minority Health. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH, VOL. 1: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1985) [hereinafter REPORT ON MINORITY HEALTH). It also served to 
slow the development of AIDS education and prevention programs in these communities. 
Nickens, AIDS, Race and the Law: The Social Construction of the Disease, 12 NovA L.J. 1179, 
1183 (1988). Although the CDC use the designation "Hispanic", see, e.g., CDC, Acquired Im-
munodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Among Blacks and Hispanics- United States, 35 MORDID· 
ITY & MoRTALITY WEEKLY REP. 655 (1986), I choose to use the term Latina to emphasize 
that most of the Hispanic women with AIDS are Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, or from 
other parts of the Americas. See also Selik, Castro & Pappaioanou, Racial/Ethnic Differences 
in the Risk of AIDS in the United States, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1539 {1988). 
2. In 1982, only 1.1% of all reported AIDS cases were attributed to heterosexual transmis-
sion. Epidemiology of HIV, supra note 1, at 610. By 1985, that number increased slightly to 
1.7%. Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1128 (1987). However, by March 1985, approximately 4% of all reported 
cases in the United States were attributed to heterosexual transmissions. CDC, Quarterly Re· 
port to the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence & Rate of Spread of HIV & AIDS in the 
United States, 259 J. A.M.A. 2657, 2657 (1988) [hereinafter Quarterly Report]. In 1989, the 
total number of reported cases increased 9%. The largest proportional increases among HIV 
exposure groups occurred for persons exposed to HIV through heterosexual contact or perinatal 
transmission. CDC, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 1989, 
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les)-3 Unlike men, women also can transmit HIV perinatally (from mother to 
child).4 The epidemiologic data indicates that eighty percent of women with 
AIDS are of childbearing age.5 Further, three-fourths of the pediatric AIDS 
cases involve perinatal transmission of the virus during the mother's preg-
nancy or during the immediate postpartum period. 6 It is estimated that thirty 
to fifty percent of infants born to HIV-infected mothers will become infected 
transplacentally. 7 
Women emerge as a target group primarily because of their ability to 
transmit HIV perinatally, i.e., to fetuses in utero. Public health officials esti-
mate that more than 200,000 AIDS cases will be reported in the United States 
by 1992.8 According to some projections, women will account for twelve per-
263 J. A.M.A. 1191, 1191 (1990). While the number of cases among adult transfusion recipi-
ents and hemophiliacs declined, and cases among gay or bisexual men increased more slowly, 
more dramatic increases are expected in the number of cases associated with heterosexual intra-
venous drug use, heterosexual contact, and perinatal transmission. /d. at 1192. 
The number of deaths attributed to HIV I AIDS in women between the ages of 15 and 44 
years of age in the United States increased from 18 in 1980 to 1430 in 1988. Impact of HIV on 
Women, supra note 1, at 226. In 1989, 2825 new cases in women were reported. /d. at 229. 
More specifically, the percentage of women who reported contracting HIV I AIDS through het-
erosexual conduct increased from 14% in 1982 to 28% in 1986 while the increase for heterosex-
ual men over the same period was only 1% ('mcreasing from 1 to 2%). Guinan & Hardy, 
Women and AIDS: The Future Is Grim, 42 J. AM. MED. WoMEN'S Ass'N 157, 157 (1987) 
[hereinafter Women and AIDS]. 
There is one reported case of female to female sexual transmission and another where this 
mode is suggested, but transmission of HIV in this manner is exceedingly rare. Epidemiology of 
HIV, supra note 1, at 614. Although lesbians are not currently considered at great risk ofHIV 
infection unless they are also intravenous drug users, they may risk infection if they decide to 
become pregnant through artificial insemination, especially if the sperm is not tested or the 
donor is infected but does not test positive. Cf. 44% of Doctors Report Tests for AIDS on 
Donated Semen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at A23, col. 1 (late ed.) (majority of physicians 
who perform artificial insemination do not test donated semen for HIV). 
3. Quarterly Report, supra note 2, at 2657. 
4. "Over 70% of the perinatally acquired AIDS cases were related to IV drug abuse in the 
child's mother or her sexual partner." Epidemiology of HIV, supra note 1, at 610-11. 
5. Women and AIDS, supra note 2, at 157. Thirty-two percent of these women are be-
tween 20 and 29 years old. /d. 
6. Quarterly Report, supra note 2, at 2657. 
7. Hoff, Berardi, Weiblen, Mahaney-Trout, :Mitchell & Grady, Seropre'.·a/ence of Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Among Childbearing Women, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 525,528 (1988) 
(20 to 60%); Selwyn, Schoenbaum, Davenny, Robertson, Feingold, Shulman, Mayers, Klein, 
Friedland & Rogers, Prospective Study of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Inftction and Preg-
nancy Outcomes in Intravenous Drug Users, 261 J. A.M.A. 1289, 1290 (1989). 
8. There is controversy within the health care community over AIDS case projections for 
the 1990s. Early predictions estimated that approltimately 365,000 to 380,000 AIDS cases 
would be reported in the United States by 1992. Staver, Knowledge About HIV Increasing. But 
AIDS Cure Remains Elusive, Am. Med. News, July 1, 1988, at 2, 7. Recently a controversy 
over the projections surfaced in The Journal of the American Medical Association [hereinafter 
J.A.M.A.] when an article by Dennis Bregman and Alexander Langmuir claimed that the 
number of reported AIDS cases by the mid-1990s would be in the range of200,000. Bregman & 
Langmuir, Fa"'s Law Applied to AIDS Projections, 263 J. A.ll,f.A. 1522, 1522 (1990). Their 
methodology and figures were criticized. See Morgan, Curran & Berkelman, The Future Course 
of AIDS in the United States, 263 J. A.M.A. 1539 (1990); Gail & Brockmeyer, Projecting the 
Incidence of AIDS, 263 J. A.M.A. 1538 (1990). Gail and Brockmeyer note that in 1986, when 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change 
HeinOnline -- 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 354 1989-1990
354 REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. XVII:351 
cent of these cases.9 In addition, many more people, male and female, who do 
not have AIDS, are infected with HIV and capable of transmitting the virus to 
others. 
The government, through the exercise of its health and safety power, has 
an interest in stopping the spread of AIDS and HIV infection without regard 
to the mode of transmission. However, since HIV can be transmitted by wo· 
men in utero, special policies and guidelines are being developed to reduce this 
mode of transmission. 10 These policies advocate routine HIV screening to 
identify and counsel HIV -infected pregnant women and women of childbear-
ing age. 11 Given the current state of obstetric technology, there are only two 
possible outcomes of this counseling which would prevent perinatal transmis-
sion: abortion for pregnant women and sterilization for all infected fertile wo· 
men. Given the racial composition of the women currently thought to be at 
risk, HIV screening and counseling proposals designed to somehow prevent 
perinatal transmission have genocidal overtones. 12 
Although women of color currently have emerged as a target group and 
are most likely to be affected by policies developed to stem the transmission of 
HIV by women, a word of caution is warranted. The statistics may unfairly 
stigmatize African-American and Latina women because they may not reflect 
·the true extent of HIV infection among all women. The primary sources of 
these statistics are state departments of public health which get information 
from hospitals, public health clinics, and private health care providers. The 
extent of underreporting among white women is unknown. 13 Historically, pri-
there were fewer than 30,000 reported cases, the projection for 1991 was 270,000. They go on 
to assert that since one million people in the United States are currently estimated to be infected 
with HIV, and if a large number go on to develop AIDS, the number of reported cases by the 
mid-1990s will far exceed 200,000. Id. at 1538. In that same issue of the J.A.M.A., the CDC 
published an update indicating that only 10% of the one million people thought infected with 
HIV have been diagnosed with AIDS. Even though early treatment with Zidovudine (formerly 
called AZ1) may slow the progression of the disease in asymptomatic individuals, the number 
of reported AIDS cases would continue to grow over the next seven years. CDC, HIV Preva-
lence, Projected AIDS Case Estimates: Workshop, October 31-November 1, 1989, 263 J. A.M.A. 
1477, 1480 (1990). 
9. Raymond, Pilot Project: Preventing Further AIDS Spread Among Women, General Het-
erosexual Population, 259 J. A.M.A. 3224, 3224 (1988). 
10. See infra notes 26, 28, 32-33 and accompanying text. 
11. CDC, Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pm•ent 
H/V Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 509, 512 {1987) (here• 
inafter Guidelines for Counseling]. 
12. Genocide is a strong term, but it has been defined as including acts such as "imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group." Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II{ d), 78 U.N.T.S. 277,280. "Group," 
according to the United Nations Genocide Convention, means a national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious group. /d. In 1986, the United States ratified The Genocide Convention. 132 Cong. 
Rec. S1355-78 {daily eel. Feb. 19, 1986). 
13. See Laumann, Gagnon, Michaels, Michael & Coleman, Monitoring the AIDS Epidemic 
in the United States: A Network Approach, 244 SCIENCE 1186, 1188 {1989) (suggesting that 
CDC undercounted the prevalence of AIDS among whites in higher socioeconomic classes and 
overestimated the prevalence in minority populations). But cf. Berkelman, Curran, Darrow, 
Dondero & Morgan, Monitoring the U.S. AIDS Epidemic, 245 SCIENCE 908 (1989) (a letter 
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vate health care providers have been notoriously bad about reporting stigma-
tizing medical conditions of patients, especially those conditions involving 
sexually transmitted diseases. 14 Arguably, the statistics may simply reflect the 
more limited access to health care available to women of color.15 Thus, poli-
cies developed to stem the spread ofHIV by women will not be effective unless 
all women who may be at risk are identified. 
II. 
HIV 'TEsTING AND SCREENING METHODOLOGIES 
Women of childbearing age who suspect that they may be infected are 
urged to be tested for the HIV antibody.16 However, one potential threat to 
the reproductive rights of women of color comes from proposals to "screen" 
from the AIDS program at the CDC refuting the claims by Laumann, et aL); Conway, Colley-
Niemeyer, Pursley, Cruz, Burt, Rion & Heath, Underreporting of AIDS Cases in South Caro-
lina, 1986 and 1987, 262 J. A.MA. 2859 (1989) (finding significantly poorer reporting among 
blacks than whites and among women). 
14. A. BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET 42-43 (1985); see also Selik, Castro & Pappaioanou, 
supra note 1, at 1543 ("The possibility that the observed higher risk in Blacks and Hispanics 
may be due to biased data needs to be considered • • • • If private physicians were more con-
cerned than other physicians about guarding the confidentiality of their patients, reporting of 
AIDS cases might be more complete in indigent (disproportionately Black and Hispanic) pa-
tients of public hospitals than in patients who can afford private medical care."). The authors 
go on to point out that it is unlikely that the figures would change significantly even if reporting 
bias exists. Id. 
15. Many of the women currently identified as infected with mv are unemployed or mar-
ginally employed with no access to private health care insurance. Staver, Minority Women 
Grappling With Growing AIDS Problem, Am. Med. News, Nov. 6, 1987, at 41. In 1985, a 
federal task force on black and minority health found that more African-Americans and His-
panics than whites have no usual source of medical care, and twice as many African-Americans 
and three times as many Hispanics as whites have no medical insurance. REPoRT ON MINOR-
ITY HEALTH, supra note 1, at 17-18. 
If insured at all, most of the women currently infected with mv are covered only by 
Medicaid. See Blendon, Aiken, Freeman & Corey, Access to Medical Care for Black and White 
Americans: A Matter of Continuing Concern, 261 J. A.l\.f.A. 278 (1989) [hereinafter Access to 
Medical Care]; Munoz, Care for the Hispanic Poor: A Growing Segment of American Society, 
260 J. A.M.A. 2711 (1988). 
"[N]ot only are blacks less likely to have any insurance coverage, but they are considerably 
less likely to be covered by a private insurance carrier •••• Moreover, on a recently developed 
measure of the breadth and generosity of states' Medicaid programs, blacks are significantly 
more likely to reside in states with the least generous programs •••• " Access to Medical Care, 
supra, at 280. 
"Hispanics, many times, cannot afford adequate health insurance and, if not covered by 
publicly financed health programs, often are not able to pay for care •••• One third of Hispanics 
have neither private health insurance nor covemge through a governmental program such as 
Medicare or Medicaid, compared with 11% of the general U.S. population." Munoz, supra, at 
2711. 
As a result, African-American and Latina women are forced to rely on public hospitals and 
clinics for health care. They are therefore more likely to be identified and reported as being 
infected with HIV than women using private health care providers. 
16. Guidelines for Counseling, supra note 11, at 512. For a comprehensive discussion of 
HIV testing issues, see Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J.L. & 1\fED. 34 
(1990). 
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targeted groups of pregnant women and nonpregnant fertile women for HIV. 
The term "screening" is to be distinguished from the term "testing''. Screen-
ing usually refers to mass testing of targeted populations to determine if they 
have a disease. 17 Screening measures for infectious diseases are usually 
designed to identify those persons who are likely to infect many others if their 
own infection is not discovered. 18 Testing, on the other hand, usually refers to 
testing of an individual. 19 
There are two types of medical screening: one to assess current health 
status, and the second to assess future health status known as predictive 
screening. 20 It is often difficult to distinguish between these two, but the dis-
tinction is important because predictive screening is more likely to raise legal 
problems. Specifically, predictive screening can be used as a basis for discrimi-
natory treatment. For example, many African-Americans experienced dis-
criminatory treatment in the 1970s when some states imposed mandatory 
screening for sickle cell disease. Misunderstanding about the medical signifi-
cance of the sickle cell trait as opposed to sickle cell disease resulted in em-
ployment discrimination by the United States Army, several major airlines, 
New York Telephone Company, and the fire and transit departments in New 
York City. 21 Some life insurance companies even raised rates or dropped cov-
erage of sickle cell carriers, without actuarial support.22 
There are three levels of HIV testing used by public health officials: 
mandatory screening, routine screening, and voluntary testing. Mandatory or 
involuntary screening is required by law or public health regulation. Routine 
screening is recommended by health care providers23 and often takes place 
17. Gostin, Curran & Clark, The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling 
AIDS- Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 11 (1987) [hereinafter Con· 
trolling AIDS]. The authors use this definition only in the context of that article. However, 
Gostin has also defined screening as "the systematic use of a medical test on population groups 
(as distinguished from case-by-case testing of individuals)." Gostin, Traditional Public Health 
Strategies, in AIDS AND THE LAW 54 (H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987) (citing Bayer, Levine & 
Wolf, HIV Antibody Screening: An Ethical Framework for Evaluating Proposed Programs, 256 
J. A.M.A. 1768 (1986)). Further, both genetic and non-genetic screening is used to determine 
whether remedial or preventive health care is needed. PRESIDENT's COMMISSION FOR THE 
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE· 
SEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC COUNDITIONS: A REPORT ON THE 
ETHICAL, SOCIAL & LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING & EDUCA· 
TION PROGRAMS 2 (1983) [hereinafter SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC 
CONDIDONS]. 
18. Controlling AIDS, supra note 17, at 11. 
19. Id. at 10. 
20. SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS, supra note 17, at 3. 
21. Riskin & Reilly, Remedies For Improper Disclosure of Genetic Data, 8 RuT.·CAM. L.J. 
480, 488-89 (1977). 
22. Id. at 489. 
23. Recently two physicians from Minnesota and the Infectious Disease section ofWiscon· 
sin Medical School recommended routine HIV screening of all persons under sixty. Rhame & 
Maki, The Case for Wider Use of Testing for HIV Infection, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1253 
(1989). 
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without the informed consent of the patient.24 Voluntary testing occurs where 
the individual affirmatively asks to be tested and is provided with counseling.25 
Mandatory HIV screening is not yet recommended for any group of women. 
The Centers for Disease Control currently recommend routine HIV screening 
of pregnant women in certain high risk groups.26 
The focus of this Article is on routine screening proposals. Routine HIV 
screening as used in this Article refers to screening individuals for HIV using 
an HIV antibody test. Screening is not compulsory (compelled by law) nor is 
24. Theoretically, routine screening should be done with the consent of the person to be 
tested after counseling. See Eickhoff, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and 
Infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 108 ANNALS INTERNAL 1\iED. 460, 
464 (1988) {position paper adopted by the Health and Public Policy Committee of the Ameri-
can College of Physicians and the Infectious Diseases Society of America). However, in a re-
port sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, a national survey of 560 randomly 
selected non-government hospitals showed that many hospitals violate CDC guidelines by not 
obtaining patient consent to HIV antibody tests. Further, 3 to 4% of the hospitals never or 
only sometimes inform patients who test positive. Hilts, Many Hospitals Found to Ignore Rights 
of Patients in AIDS Testing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1990, at A1, coL 1. The Robert Wood John-
son Foundation report only confirms an earlier study of 183 United States hospitals that con-
duct infectious disease training and 103 Minnesota hospitals which found that 34% and 57% of 
the hospitals, respectively, rarely obtained patient consent to HIV antibody tests. Henry, Wil-
lenbring & Crossley, Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Analysis of the Use of HIV Antibody 
Testing, 259 J. A.M.A. 1819, 1820 (1988). The earlier study did not distinguish between public 
and private hospitals, but the survey response rate for both groups of hospitals exceeded 90% 
and, consequently, some large urban public hospitals must have been included in the sample. 
While a few states have laws requiring informed consent to HIV screening and pre- and 
post-testing counseling, many states do not, and the federal government does not enforce CDC 
guidelines. Hilts, supra, at A1, col. 1. The head of the AIDS program at the New England 
Deaconess Hospital in Boston, the largest AIDS center in New England, is quoted as saying, 
" 'There is a fundamental lack ofleadership from the Federal level, particularly from the execu-
tive branch.' " Id. at A12, col. 5. 
At least one court has refused to recognize that health care providers have a duty to obtain 
consent to HIV antibody tests conducted on blood drawn for other purposes. Doe v. Dyer-
Goode, 389 Pa. Super. 151, 566 A.2d 889 (1989). 
Finally, it is important to note that 38% of the sickle cell anemia programs during the 
1970s screened without obtaining informed consent. Further, many facilities provided inade-
quate education and post-screening counseling. Farfel & Holtzman, Education, Consent, and 
Counseling in Sickle Cell Screening Programs: Report of a Study, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 373, 
375 (1984). 
25. Eickhoff, supra note 24, at 465. 
26. Minkoff, Care of Pregnant Women Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 
J. A.M.A. 2714, 2714 (1987). The CDC made the recommendation in 1985 and it was subse-
. quently endorsed in 1987 by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. I d. 
The Public Health Service [hereinafter PHS] recommends routine HIV screening for per-
sons seeking treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, IV -drug users, persons who consider 
themselves at risk, and women of childbearing age with identified risks. But as to the latter, 
PHS recommends that decisions about screening in the community should be based on current 
estimates of the prevalence ofHIV infection and demographic variables in infection. Guidelines 
for Counseling, supra note 11, at 512. The CDC also recommend routine screening of all per-
sons with syphilis and active tuberculosis. CDC, Recommendations for Diagnosing and Treating 
Syphilis in HIV-Infected Patients, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 600, 6()().()2. 
607-08 (1988); CDC, Diagnosis and Management of Mycobacterial Infection and Disease in Per-
sons with Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infoction, 
35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 448, 448-52 (1986). 
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it truly voluntary in the sense that the individual tested has affirmatively re-
quested testing. Rather, routine HIV screening is conducted under conditions 
of consent or where consent is presumed, like many other medical tests. The 
individual allows blood to be drawn, but may not have actual knowledge that 
she is being tested for HIV or, if she has knowledge, may not fully understand 
the possible ramifications of a positive test result.27 For example, a pregnant 
woman usually has blood drawn during her prenatal treatment. That blood is 
tested for a variety of things. The woman consents to have blood tests done, 
but generally does not know what specific tests are being ordered by the 
physician.28 
Routine prenatal HIV screening measures have been enacted by a few 
states29 and proposed by many federal officials. 30 Routine prenatal HIV an-
tibody screening31 of pregnant women raises several questions. The first is 
whether HIV prenatal screening should be routinely administered without in-
formed consent or any pre-test counseling. Some hospitals, especially those 
serving poor women of color, are routinely screening all pregnant women, 
with or without their written informed consent and without pre-test counsel-
ing. 32 The second question is whether infected pregnant women should be 
counseled to abort. To date no formal policies or guidelines prescribe direc-
27. Medical ethicists Carol Levine and Ronald Bayer acknowledge that some physicians 
interpret routine to mean "testing first and talking about it later." They reject this definition of 
"routine". Levine & Bayer, The Ethics of Screening for Early Intervention in HIV Disease, 19 
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1661, 1664 (1989) (citing Sherer, Physician Use of the HJV Antibody Test: 
The Need for Consent, Counseling, Confidentiality, and Caution, 259 J. A.M.A. 264 (1988)). 
28. It should be noted that PHS guidelines define routine counseling and testing, in the 
context of HIV, as "a policy to provide these services to all clients after informing them that 
testing will be done." This means the clients are free to decline testing without loss of health 
care, except where testing is mandated by law. Guidelines for Counseling, supra note 11, at 511. 
However, clients may have to affirmatively decline to be tested. Specifically, some forms may 
indicate that clients will be tested for HIV unless they decline. This type of "consent" form 
places the burden on the client to decline testing rather than more properly placing the burden 
on the health care provider to explain why consent to test should be given. 
29. Two states appear to require prenatal HIV tests: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 708 
(1988); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 68-5-102, 68-5-602 (1987). Florida law requires prenatal screen-
ing for all sexually transmitted diseases including HIV. 14A FLA. STAT. § 384.31 (1989); see 
14A FLA. STAT. § 384.23(3) (1989) (defining sexually transmissible disease). But it is reported 
that the state is clarifying its prenatal screening requirement so that only "high-risk" women 
will be tested for HIV. I AIDS: A PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE 2-28 (M. Rowe & C. Ryan 
eds. 1987). Several states require HIV testings of patients when health care workers are exposed 
to blood. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-230 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 32.1-45.1 (Supp. 1989). Others require testing of prisoners and/or persons convicted of sex 
offenses. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 18-3-415 (Supp. 1989) (all convicted sex offenders); GA. 
CoDE ANN. §§ 42-5-52.1, 15-11-35.1 (1985) (prisoners and juveniles convicted of transmitting 
acts); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.27 (Anderson 1988) (arrested sex offenders); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 42-56-37, 11-34-10, 21-28-4.20 (Supp. 1988) (prisoners, prostitutes, and IV-drug 
users); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). 
30. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 J. A.M.A. 1621, 1625 
(1989); Boodman, More AIDS Testing Considered, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1987, at A1, col. 1. 
31. As used in this Article, HIV antibody screening means use of the ELISA and confirm-
ing tests, like the Western Blot, in order to test specific targeted populations. 
32. See supra note 24. It is difficult to document unconsented HIV testing except through 
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tive counseling, 33 but no laws prohibit it. Given the racial composition and 
economic background of the women currently identified as at risk, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that some infected pregnant women are being urged to 
abort and that some "voluntary" decisions to terminate the pregnancy take 
place in a coerced atmosphere. Poor women and/or women of color have 
limited access to health care, and may consent to terminate their pregnancy 
fearing loss of medical treatment if they do not comply.34 They are also least 
likely to seek legal redress because they lack direct access to competent legal 
assistance and may die before their cases are heard. In addition, we cannot 
assume that all health care providers in public facilities are sympathetic and 
nonjudgmental toward poor people of color, especially pregnant women in-
fected with IllV.35 
It is important that we examine the expected outcomes of such screening. 
anecdotal evidence since health care providers may be subject to legal action in many states for 
testing without obtaining the informed consent of the patient. 
In 1987, the AIDS Discrimination Unit of the New York City Commission on Human 
Rights noted: "[i]t has been alleged that in certain parts of the country women are routinely 
screened for IllY antibodies with neither their knowledge nor their consent. Talk of the 
mandatory sterilization of, or abortion for, the seropositive women thus identified has made the 
rounds of 'health committees' nationwide." THE AIDS DISCRIMINATION UNIT OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY CoMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AIDS AND PEOPLE OF COLOR: THE DISCRIM-
INATORY IMPACT 16 (Updated Report, Aug. 1987). 
33. PHS recommends counseling before and after testing, but where pre-test counseling is 
impractical, PHS recommends that individuals be informed that they are being tested for IllY 
antibody, that the results are confidential to the extent permitted by law, and that counseling is 
available. Guidelines for Counseling, supra note 11, at 511. Dr. Howard L. l\finkoff from the 
State University of New York Health Science Center at Brooklyn recommends counseling in-
fected pregnant women about: (1) the impact of IllY on pregnancy and the effect of pregnancy 
on progression of the disease; (2) the risk of transmission of IllY to the child; and (3) the risk of 
transmission to sexual partners and possible infection in older children. Minkoff, supra note 26, 
at 2714-15. 
Another article on this issue discussed the problems inherent in establishing a prenatal 
program to screen and counsel for IllY. Sachs, Tuomala & Frigoletto, Acquir~d Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome: Suggested Protocol for Counseling and Screening in Pregnancy, 70 OB. & 
GYN. 408 (1987) [hereinafter Protocol for Pregnancy]. These authors set up a voluntary pro-
gram and positive patients were "provided counseling, which includes the option of an induced 
abortion." The test is repeated during the third trimester and "[i]f the patient has serocon-
verted or initially decided against the option of an induced abortion (where recommended), 
counseling is provided and the pediatric service notified." Id. at 409. In this program the coun-
seling is uniform and performed by specially trained social workers and nurses. This counseling 
includes the following information: "[t]he exact risk of an infant's developing AIDS.related 
illness is unknown, but may be as high as 65%. The patient is offered the option to terminate 
the pregnancy; if this is unacceptable, pediatric follow-up . • • is arranged. • • • Counseling 
services are made available to discuss the issues of future childbearing." I d. at 410. Counseling 
is done prior to testing and includes a discussion of the disadvantages of being tested. In addi-
tion, a written consent form must be signed. Id. 
34. One commentator notes that women, regardless of color or education level, are less 
likely than men to question doctor's orders. Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductire Lav.'S, Women of 
Color, and Low-Income Women, 11 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 15, 26 (1989). 
35. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. There is evidence that among medical resi-
dents the AIDS epidemic has created a high perception of risk and a dislike for IllY patients. 
Cooke & Sande, Sounding Board: The HIV Epidemic and Training in Internal Medicine, 321 
NEW ENG. J. MEo. 1334, 1334-35 (1989). The medical literature indicates that practitioners 
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Some individuals argue that HIV -infected pregnant women should be coun-
seled to abort rather than give birth to babies who may be infected and die, or 
who may shortly become orphans when their infected mothers (and fathers) 
die of AIDS. 36 This practice constitutes directive counseling. There are two 
basic forms of medical counseling, directive and nondirective. Directive coun-
seling occurs where the counselor has a duty not only to inform the woman or 
couple about possible genetic or other outcomes of pregnancy, but also must 
instruct the woman or couple on whether or not to bear children.37 Nondirec-
tive counseling can take several forms, but tries in varying degrees to preServe 
the client/patient's autonomy in decision making. 38 
still are fearful of persons with AIDS. See, e.g., Gerbert, Maguire, Badner, Altman & Stone, 
Why Fear Persists: Health Care Professionals and AIDS, 260 J. A.M.A. 3481 (1988). 
In addition, there is evidence of continuing racial bias in medicine. See, e.g., CDC, Black· 
White Differences in Cervical Cancer Mortality - United States, 1980..1987, 263 J. A.M.A. 
3001, 3002 (1990) (higher mortality rate for black women from cervical cancer only partly 
explained by socioeconomic status); Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Medical Ass'n, 
Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 J. A.M.A. 2344, 2344 (1990) (noting persistent and 
often substantial differences in health between blacks and whites, even when blacks have access 
to the health care system, and citing obstetrics as one of the areas studied); Egbert & Rothman, 
Relation Between the Race and Economic Status of Patients and Who Performs Their Surgery, 
297 NEw ENG. J. MED. 90, 90 (1977) (noting that blacks were more likely to be under the care 
of resident surgeons even when they could afford to pay for medical services); Eisenberg, Socio· 
logic Influences on Decision-Making by Clinicians, 90 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 957, 958 (1979) 
(noting that the race of the patient can influence clinical decisions); Wenneker & Epstein, Racial 
Inequalities in the Use of Procedures for Patients with Ischemic Heart Disease in Massachusetts, 
261 J. A.M.A. 253 (1989) (even taking into account socioeconomic status, patient preference, 
and severity of disease, study results suggest racial inequality in the use of procedures for pa· 
tients hospitalized with coronary heart disease). 
36. Finck, Speakers Note AIDS Threat to Black Community, Am. Med. News, Dec. 11, 
1987, at 17 (quoting Dr. Beny J. Primm, President of the Addiction Research & Treatment 
Corporation in Brooklyn). Ronald Bayer, an associate at the Hastings Center, a medical ethics 
think tank, and someone who favors nondirective counseling ofHIV-infected women, said, "I 
think it would not be a mistake to say abortion is a good idea." Gross, Added AIDS Services Are 
Set for Poor Women, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1988, at Y17, col. 5 (nat'l ed.). 
37. A. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 42-44 (1987); D. 
KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 257· 
58 (1985) ("In the early years of genetic counseling, some geneticists had sought to tum the 
practice to eugenic advantage - to reduce the incidence of genetic disease in the population, 
and by extension to reduce the frequency of deleterious genes in what population geneticists 
were coming to call the human gene pool. To that end, some claimed that it was the counselor's 
duty not simply to inform couples about the possible genetic outcome of their union but also to 
instruct them whether or not to bear children at all. Through the fifties, however, the standards 
of genetic counseling had turned strongly against eugenically oriented advice - that is, advice 
aimed at the welfare of the gene pool rather than that of the family. The standards also had it 
that no counselor had the right to tell a couple not to have a child, even for the sake of the 
couple's own welfare.") (footnote omitted). 
38. Dr. John Arras cites three examples of nondirective counseling: (1) nondirective sup-
portive counseling where the counselor simply provides factual information and supports the 
client/patient in her decision, whatever it is; (2) nondirective probing counseling where the 
counselor confronts the client/patient with any contradictions between the client/patient's 
value system and stated wishes; and (3) nondirective educational counseling which he claims 
respects the decision-making autonomy of the client/patient, but rejects the notion that this 
autonomy is unfettered. Instead the counselor not only informs, but raises moral issues posed 
by the client's choices. Arras, HIV Infection and Reproductive Decisions: An Ethical Analysis 1· 
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HIV screening of nonpregnant fertile women raises an additional ques-
tion, namely whether infected women should be counseled to be sterilized. 
Many medical personnel believe that infected fertile women, especially poor 
women who are unmarried intravenous drug users or are the sexual partners 
'of intravenous drug users, have no right to bear children.39 As one New York 
physician noted: "There are people out there who would find it suitable if 
these women [African-American and Latina] stopped having babies alto-
gether. It is too easy to feed into those racist agendas."40 
III. 
A HisTORY OF RACIST MEDICINE 
While reproductive freedom issues affect all women, HIV screening and 
counseling policies directed at women will have a disproportionate impact on 
women of color, especially African-American and Latina women. Given the 
history of racist medicine sanctioned by the United States government,41 there 
is ample reason to be suspicious of policies developed by federal and state 
governmental entities that disproportionately impact on women of color. Spe-
cifically, there is a history of sterilization abuse by government employees 
against women of color. For example, medical residents in many public teach-
ing hospitals have forced women of color to be sterilized so that they could get 
more practice at performing tubal ligations and hysterectomies.42 More than 
9, Presentation at The Fifth International Conference on AIDS, Montreal, Canada (June 4-9, 
1989) (on file with author). Dr. John Arras is philosopher in residence and Associate Professor 
in the Department of Epidemiology and Social Medicine at Montefiore Medical Center, Albert 
Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York. 
39. Donovan, AIDS and Family Planning Clinics: Confronting the Crises, 19 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 111 (1987). 
40. Gross, Bleak Lives: Women Carrying AIDS, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1987, at A1, col. 1, 
B5, col 3 (quoting Dr. Peter A. Selwyn of the Montefior Medical Center in Boston). 
41. See, e.g., A. CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS: THE SOCIAL COST OF NEW SCIEN-
TIFIC RACISM (1980); J. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS ExPERJMENT (1981); 
J. HALLER, OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORJTY 
1859-1900 (1971); T. SA VITI, MEDICINE AND SLAVERY: THE HEALTH CARE AND DISEASES 
OF BLACKS IN ANTEBELLUM VIRGINIA (1978); W. STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: SciEN-
TIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA 1815-1859 (1968). The most recent highly 
publicized example of race medicine involves the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment conducted by 
the Public Health Service from 1932 to 1972 on more than 400 African-American sharecrop-
pers and day laborers in Alabama. This government study was designed to determine the effects 
of untreated syphilis in African-American males, and medical treatment was intentionally v.ith-
held from the study subjects who thought they were being treated for all medical conditions. 
The study was conducted despite the fact that it violated state law. J. JONES, supra. For a 
discussion of racist medical and social assumptions underlying the initiation of the Tuskegee 
Study, see Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, HAsTINGS 
CENTER REP., Dec. 1978, at 21. For another example of racist medicine, see Ntelsen, Women 
Victims of Medical Experimentation: J. Marion Sims' Surgery on Slal·e Women, 1845-1850, 2 
SAGE 10 (1985). 
42. Larned, The Epidemic in Unnecessary Hysterectomy, in SEIZING OUR BODIES 202 (C. 
Driefus ed. 1977). See generally Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and 
Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN's LJ. 51, 
93-101 (1983); Grosooll, Sterilization Abuse: Current State of the Law and Remedies for Abuse, 
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twenty-five percent of native American women are sterilized; in one year 
alone, 132 women were sterilized at the federally operated Claremore, 
Oklahoma Indian Hospital.43 Forty-three percent of the women sterilized in 
federally funded population programs are African-American.44 Latina wo-
men fare no better. As recently as 1981, a psychologist found that sixty-five 
percent of Puerto Rican women in Hartford, Connecticut and fifty-five percent 
of all Latina women in Springfield, Massachusetts had been sterilized.45 Some 
of these women undoubtedly wanted to be sterilized, but paternalistic attitudes 
about poor women and women of color often cause physicians to believe that 
sterilization is the only method of birth control poor women of color are capa-
ble of handling. 46 
In the 1970s, disclosure that an illiterate African-American mother was 
tricked under the auspices of an Office of Economic Opportunity program into 
consenting to the sterilization of her two daughters, ages 12 and 14, helped 
lead to the requirement of written informed consent and waiting periods 
where federal funds are used for sterilization.47 Even with this requirement, 
thousands of poor women, usually women of color, continue to be sterilized 
without their informed consent. 48 
Another chilling example is the sterilization between 1971 and 1974 of 
ten nonconsenting Mexican-American women by a public hospital in Los An-
geles. The women sued and presented evidence that the hospital staff pres-
sured the women to consent during intensive labor by: (1) withholding 
10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 1147, 1153-56 (1980); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 34, at 20-23, 30-
32. 
43. G. GREER, SEX AND DESTINY: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN FERTILITY 133 (1984). 
44. Id. at 331. 
45. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 34, at 31 n.120 (citing personal communication from Dr. 
Vickie Barnes, Brookside Family Health Center, Jamaica Plain, Boston, Apr. 1985). The au-
thor discusses several other forms of sterilization abuse like the removal of female reproductive 
organs from women with fibroid tumors. Id. at 31. 
46. ld. (citing MARTHA ELIOT HEALTH CENTER, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH REPORT 1-2 
(1985)) ("Classism and racism lead physicians and other health care providers to urge steriliza-
tion on patients they believe incapable of using other methods effectively. For example, a Bos-
ton clinic serving primarily black clients reported that 45 percent of its black clients 'chose' 
tubal ligation as a method of birth control after their first child was born."). For a more de-
tailed discussion of subtle forms of sterilization abuse, see Clarke, Subtle Forms of Sterilization 
Abuse: A Reproductive Rights Analysis, in TEST TUBE WOMEN 188, 199 (R. Arditti, R. Klein & 
S. Minden eds. 1989). 
47. D. KEVLES, supra note 37, at 275-76 (1985). Their mother thought that her 'X' on the 
paper authorized her daughters to receive "shots." Id. at 276; see also Relfv. Weinberger, 372 
F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.250-
.259 (1988); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201-.210 (1989) (regulations requiring written informed consent 
and waiting periods). 
48. Magar, Medicaid Sterilization Rules Violated: Group, 61 A.B.A. J. 1249 (1981) (re-
porting alleged violations of the age and waiting period requirement and noting that it is impos-
sible to document continuing abuses without information supplied by health care workers). 
Another reason the federal regulations are often ignored is there are no civil or criminal sanc-
tions imposed for violations. The only sanction is loss of reimbursement for the sterilization. 
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1397(a)(1) (1982). This is not a very effective sanction for a doctor in a public 
hospital who is on salary. Magar, supra. 
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medication, (2) not informing women that the procedure was permanent, or 
(3) pressuring some husbands to sign consent forms after their wives refused. 49 
In some cases no attempt was made to obtain consent. 5° The women's lawyers 
presented testimony for two and a half weeks to support their claim that the 
plaintiffs had not given informed consent. 
The defendants presented no opposing expert witnesses or rebuttal of 
plaintiffs' witnesses, nor did they cross-examine the plaintiffs. Instead, they 
called each of the physicians in question to comment on the medical proce-
dures used. Each physician asserted that the women consented despite the 
language barrier. 51 The federal trial judge entered judgment for the defend-
ants, finding that there was a breakdown in communication between the wo-
men and the physicians, and that the physicians could not be blamed for 
misinterpreting the women's actions.52 
Given the racial composition of women currently identified as infected 
with HIV, and in light of the recent history of abuse, there is reason to believe 
that the abuse of reproductive rights will continue with HIV-infected women. 
Recently in New Mexico a Latina with AIDS who lacked money for an abor-
tion was offered a free abortion only if she submitted to a tubal ligation. 53 In 
addition, some people alarmed at the increased number of pregnant drug ad-
dicts, many of whom are poor women of color, are calling for sterilization of 
all drug addicted women of childbearing age. 54 Since a large number of HIV-
infected women are also drug users, there is reason to believe fertile HIV-
infected women will be viewed similarly.55 
49. Velez-I., The Nonconsenting Sterilization of Mexican Women in Los Angeles, in TWJC£ 
A MINORITY: MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN 235, 240, 242 (M. Melville ed. 1980). 
50. Id. at 240. 
51. See id. at 244-45 (physicians testified that they spoke "obstetrics sp:mish" and all the 
women were Spanish-speaking and spoke limited English.). 
52. Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057 JWC, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1978). 
53. Abraham, Pregnant Women Face AIDS Dilemma, Am. Med. News, July 22, 1988, at 
35 (citing Jane Aiken, a law professor at Arizona State University and an attorney for Mobiliza-
tion Against AIDS in Phoenix). 
54. Ideas & Trends: Punishing Pregnant Addicts: Debate, Disma$ No Solution, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at E5, col. 1 (late ed.) (citing Dr. Jan Bays, Director of Child Abuse 
Programs at Emanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon who said: "I consider myself quite liberal 
and never would have thought this a few years ago. But now I'm fed up with seeing damaged 
babies born who lost the right to make what they can out of life. ••• But we can't force people 
into treatment [for drug addiction], even if they're in jail. She can go out and have more chil-
dren. So, people are talking about sterilization and that gets into reproductive rights •••• We 
can't say forever that people have unlimited rights to have a child"); see also Boyer, Time To 
Sterilize Addicted Mothers, Blue Bell, Pa., Observer, Sept. 6, 1989, at 32 (wherein a columnist in 
a Philadelphia area newspaper wrote that "[w]omen who are irresponsible enough to become 
pregnant over and over while addicted to harmful drugs do not deserve to crow about their civil 
rights." The writer advocates the "temporary" sterilization of women of childbearing age who 
are addicts suggesting that a contraceptive implant, Norplant, be used). 
55. In fact, at the Fifth International Conference on AIDS held in Montreal, Canada, June 
4-9, 1989, at least one panelist discussing HIV infection and reproductive decision making ar-
gued that it might be ethical to counsel women infected with HIV not to have children; it might 
even be ethical, he implied, to counsel pregnant women infected with HIV to abort. He did, 
however, stop short of calling for sterilization of infected women. Arras, supra note 38. 
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Despite the history of racist public medicine in this country, and the cur-
rent disproportionate impact of HIV screening policies on women of color, the 
equal protection clause is unlikely to afford any relief. While proof that a 
facially neutral government policy has a disparate impact on women of color 
may be evidence of a racially discriminatory intent, the existence of a disparate 
impact alone is not enough to trigger strict scrutiny of the policy by the 
courts. 56 The courts look for additional factors to satisfy the racial animus 
requirement. 57 The existence of blatant racist medical practices by the Public 
Health Service into the 1970s,58 and the more limited access to medical care 
which African-Americans from all income levels receive due to lingering ra-
cial discrimination, 59 would not be enough for courts to find an intent to dis-
criminate in the initiation of routine prenatal HIV screening programs. 60 
The difficulty of demonstrating racial animus (intent to discriminate) in 
56. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
Even though screening programs would be directed only at infected women of childbearing 
age, it would be difficult to challenge routine HIV prenatal screening on pure sex discrimination 
grounds in light of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Court upheld 
California's disability insurance program which exempted from coverage work loss due to preg· 
nancy. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, wrote: "[l]t does not follow that every legisla· 
tive classification concerning pregnancy is a sex based classification." The Court noted that it ls 
necessary to show that pregnancy is merely a pretext for some intentional gender-based discrim· 
ination. Id. at 496 n.20. Since Geduldig, the courts consistently have refused to recognize sex 
equality claims based on reproductive differences. One recent example of the courts' hostile 
attitude toward pregnancy is International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (en bane) (upholding trial court decision that an employer's "fetal protection" policy 
precluding fertile women, but not men, from working in high lead exposure position was a bona 
fide occupational qualification under Title VII), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). For early 
discussions of the failure of formal equality doctrines to provide real equality for women en· 
gaged in childbearing, see Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 
YALE L.J. 913, 931-37 (1983); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
955, 982-1002 (1984); Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 398 (1981). 
The dialogue between feminist scholars on this issue continues and has developed various alter· 
native dialogues. For a discussion of the differences among feminist legal scholars on this issue, 
see Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). 
51. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68 (factors examined include history of the problem 
sought to be remedied and legislative or administrative history). 
58. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussions of the Tuskegee experiment 
and sterilization abuse). 
59. See generally REPORT ON MINORITY HEALTH, supra note 1. Former Surgeon General 
C. Everett Koop said that improved access to health care for blacks and Hispanics is essential to 
the fight against AIDS. He also said that discrimination in access to health care, language 
problems, and poverty are as much at the heart of the epidemic as drug use and promiscuity. 
Koop Cites Poverty and Bias as Factors in AIDS Spread, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1988, at C9, col. 
3; see also supra note 35. 
60. Even if racial animus were a factor, but not the primary motivating factor, in the 
implementation of the policy, it would be difficult to strike down under current equal protection 
doctrines. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 
270-71 n.21. But even if an intent to discriminate could be shown, because the discrimination is 
directed only at African-American and Latina women, courts would likely try to characterize 
the action as a sex-based rather than a race-based claim. For a discussion of the failure of 
claims by African-American women, see Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and An· 
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order to trigger strict scrutiny of government-conceived screening measures, 
coupled with the courts' traditional deference to health care policies, 61 makes 
an equal protection argument difficult in this case. The unavailability of a 
strong equal protection argument in the face of past and lingering racial bias 
in medicine and medical policies illustrates the failure of formal equality doc-
trines to provide women and men of color protection from real and harmful 
discriminatory actions by government. The requirement of proof of intent 
before racial discrimination is considered unlawful under the equal protection 
clause legitimizes discriminatory policies that result from "unconscious" or 
structural racial bias. 62 
IV. 
A CRITIQUE OF POLICIES FOR STEl\fMING PERINATAL 
TRANSMISSION OF HlV 
A. Prenatal Screening 
1. In General 
Public health regulations in some states mandate prenatal screening of 
pregnant women for certain medical conditions like syphilis, 63 maternal ru-
bella, blood group, and RH status. 64 All of these conditions, if detected prior 
to the end of pregnancy, can be treated and the fetus protected. 
There is a second category of health-threatening, but detectable, condi-
tions that usually is not subject to mandatory or routine screening. Tests for 
sickle cell disease, Tay-Sachs, and other diseases of genetic origin generally are 
tiracist Policies, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139; Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Find-
ing Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989). 
61. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory small-
pox vaccination law). But cj. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 
648 {2d Cir. 1979) (holding that public health agencies must adhere to constitutional and statu-
tory standards). Corey indicates that current courts may not be as deferential to public health 
regulations that disproportionately impact people against whom such regulations have been 
applied discriminatorily in the past. 
62. For a discussion of anti-discrimination law's failure to address adequately actual racial 
discrimination, see Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitima-
tion in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HAR.v. L. REv. 1331 {1988) {discussing the impact of lib-
eral and radical scholarship on legal thinking about anti-discrimination law); Lawrence, The I d. 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 
(1987) (critiquing the theories to determine suspect classification). 
63. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-694(B) {1986). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 3222-23 {West 1979); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 25-4-201 (1989); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
90 (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 4801 {Smith-Hurd 1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26:4-49.1 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-10 {1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2308 
(McKinney 1985); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3701.50 {Anderson 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, § 1-515 {West 1984); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 68-5-602 (1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 4419b-1 (Vernon 1976); WYo. STAT. § 35-4-502 (1977) (all specifying mandatory prenatal 
testing for syphilis). 
64. Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL. L. REv. 435, 442 (citing 
Frankel, The Specter of Eugenics, 51 CoMMENTARY 25, 29 (1974)). 
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not required or performed routinely.65 In 1970 when an inexpensive and relia-
ble test for sickle cell hemoglobin was developed, several states enacted 
mandatory screening programs which resulted in unjustifiable discrimination 
against African-Americans.66 Subsequently, six states (Georgia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia) and the District of Co-
lumbia repealed their mandatory screening laws. 67 Currently, the National 
Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs, and Genetic Diseases Act 
authorizes federal grants for voluntary genetic testing and counseling 
programs. 68 
Amniocentesis, which tests for chromosomal abnormalities and heredi-
tary diseases and is recommended for pregnant women over thirty-five years of 
age, is also not required. 69 It is performed only with the informed consent of 
the woman. In fact, amniocentesis is not recommended for all pregnant wo-
men because of the fear that the test might lead to unnecessary abortions. 70 
What distinguishes the first from this second category of medical conditions is 
that the latter cannot be treated prior to delivery and can only be avoided by 
not becoming pregnant or by abortion. 
Since few genetic diseases respond to medical treatment, the primary pur-
pose of genetic testing is to detect carriers and counsel fertile women about the 
genetic risks of childbearing. 71 Therefore, voluntary testing, as opposed to 
routine screening, for genetic conditions is encouraged. 
There are three types of genetic testing: (1) screening of newborns, (2) 
carrier screening, and (3) prenatal screening. 72 Carrier testing is offered to 
persons of reproductive age to detect recessive disorders before conception. 73 
Prenatal screening is used to determine whether the fetus has genetic disorders 
or congenital defects. 74 
65. P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 102-06 (1977). 
66. Id. at 12-74. 
67. Comment, Sickle Cell Legislation: Beneficence or "The New Ghetto Hustle"?, 13 J. 
FAM. L. 278, 278 n.6 (1973-1974). 
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300b-1 to 300b-6 (1988). 
69. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, TASK FORCE REPORT: PRE· 
DICTIONS OF HEREDITARY DISEASE OR CONGENITAL DEFECTS, CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT 
CONFERENCE ON ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS 35-47 (1979). 
Amniocentesis, developed during the late 1960s and 1970s, is a reliable and safe prenatal 
screening test. It is usually performed during the 14th or 16th week of pregnancy. A needle 
attached to a syringe is inserted into the uterus and a sample of the fluid surrounding the fetus is 
removed. This sample, which contains fetal cells, is cultured for two to four weeks. The cul-
tured cells are then examined for any of approximately one hundred genetic conditions. War-
ren, The Law of Human Reproduction: An Overview, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 49-50 (1982). 
70. Annas, Is a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is?, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 16. 
71. Note, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Genetic Screening Statutes, 31 CASE W. RES. 
L. REv. 897, 905 (1981). 
72. SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS, supra note 17, at 11·12. 
Genetic screening as used in this Article refers primarily to prenatal or carrier screening. 
73. Id. at 17-18. 
74. Id. at 23. 
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There are four reasons given to justify mandatory or routine genetic 
screening: (1) to save society money by controlling health costs; (2) to allocate 
resources fairly; (3) to improve society's "genetic health"; and (4) to protect 
the helpless from harm.75 Ethicists believe that only the last argument is suffi-
ciently plausible to justify compulsory genetic screening.76 Even when com-
pulsory genetic screening is appropriate, it should be implemented only after 
voluntary measures have failed.77 Further, compulsory genetic screening 
measures when initiated must not only reach the targeted population, but also 
must provide for needed follow-up services, something that rarely occurs in 
practice. 78 
Screening pregnant women for HIV is much like genetic screening in that 
currently there is no medical cure for the infection and the virus can be trans-
mitted to another. 79 HIV infection, like several genetic conditions, may result 
in death or serious medical complications. Like genetic conditions, voluntary 
testing as opposed to routine HIV screening should be the standard practice. 
2. HIV Prenatal Screening 
Screening for reproductive reasons is inherently genetic.80 Proponents of 
75. Id. at 47-52. 
76. Id. at 50-51. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 52. Lawrence Gostin and two other public health specialists assert that HIV 
screening of selected populations is unlikely to result in any real benefit to the public health 
service since currently there is no effective treatment or cure for an HIV infection. Controlling 
AIDS, supra note 17, at 19. They argue that the personal and economic costs of compulsory 
screening programs far outweigh any benefit to public health. Id. at 20. Gostin sets forth five 
criteria to apply when evaluating compulsory screening proposals. Fust, any screening should 
be directed toward a narrowly targeted population with a potentially high rate of infection. 
Second, the population targeted for screening must also pose a high risk of transmitting the 
infection to others. Third, if all persons within the targeted population are to be screened, then 
the information obtained must be used to effectively minimize the risk of transmission. Fourth, 
the consequences to the individual of screening should not outweigh the benefits to public 
health. Fifth, there must be no less restrictive or intrusive means to accomplish the public 
health objective. Id. at 21-24. Applying these criteria to routine HIV prenatal screening, the 
first two are met, but there are questions about the remaining three. 
There is much controversy over recent assertions that early treatment intervention with 
zidovudine (also known as AZ1) slows the progression of the virus in asymptomatic infected 
individuals. Compare NISID, Recommendations for Zidovudine: Early Infection, 263 J. 
A.M.A. 1606 (1990) (National Institutes of Health recommendation for early intervention with 
AZ1) and Volberding, Lagakos, Koch, Pettinelli, Myers, Booth, Balfour, Reichman, J.A. Bart-
lett, Hirsch, Murphy, Hardy, Soeiro, Fischl, J.G. Bartlett, Merigan, Hyslop, Richman, Valen-
tine, Corey & AIDS Clinical Trial Group of NIAID, Zidovudine in Asymptomatic Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 322 NEW ENG. J. 1\fEo. 941 (1990) (favors early interven-
tion) with Cotton, Controversy Continues as Experts Ponder Zidovudine's Role in Early HIV 
Infection, 263 J. A.M.A. 1605 (1990) (reporting that investigators at the Veteran's Administra-
tion and in Europe are skeptical about the early use of AZf, especially in light of the short 
clinical study - less than one year) and Friedland, Early Treatment for HIV: The Time Has 
Come, 322 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 1000 (1990) (worries that early intervention may cause patients 
to become resistant to AZ'I). 
79. Controlling AIDS, supra note 17, at 19. 
80. SCREENING AND CoUNSELING FOR GENETIC CoNDITIONS, supra note 17, at 3. 
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routine HIV prenatal screening raise the same arguments as proponents of 
compulsory or routine genetic screening. Assuming that the first three argu-
ments for mandatory or routine genetic screening are not valid bases for im-
posing mandatory or routine HIV prenatal screening, I tum to the fourth 
argument that preventing a medical condition which threatens the health of a 
woman or fetus and which can be detected before or during pregnancy is 
clearly an important state goal. 
First, there has been no showing that voluntary HIV testing has been 
ineffective. 81 In fact, until very recently there were no voluntary HIV testing 
programs directed toward women who might be at risk. 82 Second, routine 
HIV screening proposals tend to ignore follow-up services. These services can 
be costly, and they rarely are provided unless private insurance pays for 
them. 83 If needed follow-up services are not available to fertile HIV -infected 
women, little is gained by screening. 
81. See Walters, Ethical Issues in the Prevention and Treatment of HIV Infection and 
AIDS, 239 SCIENCE 597, 599 (1988) ("To date, most commentators on the ethics of HIV an· 
tibody screening have argued that only carefully targeted, voluntary screening programs are 
morally justifiable and that such programs are morally justified only if they fulfill three condi· 
tions: (i) the programs include adequate counseling of screenees; (ii) they protect the confidenti-
ality of information about individuals, except in carefully specified exceptional circumstances; 
and (iii) they are conducted in a context that provides guarantees of nondiscrimination to sero· 
positive individuals."). 
To date, publicly funded voluntary HIV testing programs have been directed toward the 
gay and bisexual community. Only 12.6% of the programs have been available at family plan· 
ning centers; 10.1% at prenatal/obstetrics clinics; and 3.5% at drug-treatment centers. CDC, 
Publicly Funded HIV Counseling and Testing- United States, 1985-1989, 39 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 137 (1990). 
82. Two authors writing in a medical journal allege that women at risk for exposure to 
HIV are often discouraged from having the test. Women and AIDS, supra note 2, at 158. 
"With little exception, HIV research and programs have focused exclusively on homosex· 
ual men and intravenous drug users. As a result, there is limited information about the course 
of HIV infection in women." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN 
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 13 (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL AIDS COMMIS· 
SION]. 
A letter in a prominent medical journal alleges that although the first reported diagnosis of 
a woman with AIDS occurred in 1981 in New York City, the earliest reported birth in New 
York City of a baby with AIDS, where maternal transmission was presumed, was in 1977. 
Thomas, O'Donnell, Williams & Chiasson, HIV Infection in Heterosexual Female Intra~·enous 
Drug Users in New York City, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 374, 374 (1988) (letter from New York 
City Dep't of Health); see also Lambert, Unlikely AIDS Sufferer's Message: Don't Think It Can't 
Happen To You, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, at 29, col. 1 (upper class white woman with AIDS 
who was not tested earlier because of her background). 
83. Several health care providers warn that sound screening programs for pregnant women 
are costly. See, e.g., Protocol for Pregnancy, supra note 33, at 411 ("At this time, with only a few 
pregnant patients who are human immunodeficiency virus-positive, it is possible to provide such 
a service. But we are concerned that if the incidence increases, we will be forced to cut cor-
ners."); Selwyn, Carter, Schoenbaum, Robertson, Klein & Rogers, Knowledge of HIV Antibody 
Status and Decisions to Continue or Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 J. 
A.M.A. 3567, 3568 (1989) [hereinafter Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status] ("Given the likeli-
hood of more widespread HIV antibody testing during pregnancy, and the consequent identifi· 
cation of infected women, it is critical that sufficient resources to provide such support and 
follow-up be made available in all areas where testing is undertaken."). 
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On the other hand, the HIV antibody test is a simple blood test which 
poses no significant medical risk to women. Many women, upon learning of 
their antibody status, voluntarily choose to either terminate or forego preg-
nancy. 84 HIV prenatal screening can also provide an indirect benefit to the 
fetus since physicians might be able to detect an HIV-infected fetus earlier and 
perhaps prolong its life after it is born. 85 In addition, public health officials 
have a long history of mandatory and routine screening for sexually transmit-
ted diseases, 86 and HIV can be transmitted sexually. 
Opponents of genetic screening argue that because few genetic diseases 
respond to medical treatment, the real function of screening is detection of 
carriers to discourage them from having children. 87 They contend that this 
purpose threatens women's reproductive freedom, and, when done by the state 
or federal government, raises serious right to privacy issues. 88 
The practical value of routine HIV prenatal screening is also questiona-
ble. Screening may mean fewer health benefits to women since the medical 
community remains uncertain about the effects of pregnancy on mY-infected 
women. 89 Moreover, most information gained through prenatal screening can 
be discovered through newborn screening.90 Thus, although the stated health 
interest - protection of the health of the mother and the fetus - could be 
84. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. 
85. A wrongful birth or wrongful life action might lie against a physician who failed to 
determine that the HIV-infected infant's mother was infected and capable of transmitting the 
virus perinatally. See Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe v. Wade.· HoYJ Via-
ble Is Roe's Vzability Standard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113, 137-41 (1983). Theoretically the 
fetus may benefit by not being born if there is a substantial risk that it will be infected with the 
virus. 
86. A. BRANDT, supra note 14, at 85. By 1918 thirty-two states had laws requiring com-
pulsory examination of prostitutes for venereal disease. Id.; see, e.g., Reynolds v. McNichols, 
488 F.2d 1378 {lOth Cir. 1973) (upholding regulation allowing detention of one suspected of 
having a venereal disease); People ex rel Baker v. Strautz, 386 lll. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441 (1944) 
(upholding detention of prostitutes without bond for examination of venereal disease); Ex parte 
Company, 106 Ohio 50, 139 N.E. 204 (1922) (regulation authorizing quarantine of persons 
suspected of having venereal disease). But cf. Wragg v. Griffin, 185 Iowa 243, 252-53, 170 N.W. 
400, 402-03 (1919) (Iowa Supreme Court held that one cannot be compelled to give blood on a 
mere suspicion that she has a venereal disease). 
87. Note, supra note 71, at 905. 
88. Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 
Nw. U.L. REv. 696, 711-12 (1973). See generally Note, supra note 71. 
89. Early reports expressed concern that pregnancy accelerated the progression of the dis-
ease. Today, however, there is little evidence that pregnancy will enhance the disease's progres-
sion. No information is available on the impact of abortion during the first or second trimester 
on the disease•s progression. Minkoff, supra note 26. "Although uncontrolled obsen·ations 
from two studies suggest a high frequency of AIDS and associated conditions in women during 
the months after delivery, the identification or selection of cases to follow could be biased and 
the variable that is probably the most important in determining clinical HIV infection- dura-
tion of infection- is unknown in almost all cases." Allen & Curran, Pre~·ention of AIDS and 
HIV Infections: Needs and Priorities for Epidemiologic Research, 78 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 381, 
383 (1988). 
90. Levine & Bayer, supra note 27, at 1662 {the level of test accuracy for infants varies 
quite a bit since infants born to infected mothers may test positive for up to 15 or 16 months 
following birth, but not be infected). There is no proven treatment for asymptomatic infected 
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sufficient to permit routine screening, the actual screening procedure does not 
usually accomplish this purpose. Intensive educational programs directed at 
women of childbearing age, accompanied by access to free or low cost volun· 
tary testing, might be as effective. 
Additionally, routine HIV prenatal screening may prompt many HIV • 
infected women to forego needed prenatal care to avoid detection of their an· 
tibody status. These women have good cause to be afraid that HIV prenatal 
screening will affect their access to further health care. There are anecdotes of 
obstetricians refusing to care for pregnant women unless they are screened for 
HIV.91 In such cases consent to screen, if requested, is obtained by coercion.92 
Further, because of the lack of opportunity to consider specific adverse conse-
quences, routine HIV prenatal screening which relies on a general consent 
form may not constitute informed consent, especially when there is no pre-test 
counseling. 93 
The stigma of a positive HIV antibody test - loss of employment, insur-
ance, housing, and other economic or social harm - provides another reason 
for women who suspect they are infected with HIV to avoid routine prenatal 
screening.94 Even though persons infected with HIV or AIDS have some pro-
infants. Id. There is also controversy over using experimental treatments on infants. !d. at 
1663. 
91. There are reports that, at an Atlanta hospital that does routine HIV prenatal screen· 
ing, women sign a general consent form and there is no pre-test counseling. Abraham, Pregnant 
Women Face AIDS Dilemma, Am. Med. News, July 22, 1988, at 35. The testing functions 
primarily to protect the hospital staff because "universal precautions are still not widely used." 
I d. 
92. See, e.g., Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989) (gov-
ernment may not grant a benefit conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional right.). 
93. There are two different standards for informed consent. The older, traditional stan-
dard holds that informed consent is only required where the medical practice or procedure 
deviates from the accepted medical practice of a reasonable physician in similar circumstances. 
The more modern view, called the prudent patient standard, requires the physician to provide 
all the information a reasonable patient would need to make an informed decision. See gener· 
ally Comment, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participation in Medical Decision· 
making, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 172 (1981); Kabnick & Meisel, Informed Consent to Medical 
Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITI. L. REV. 407 (1980); Comment, New 
Trends in Informed Consent, 54 NEB. L. REv. 66 (1975). 
Most commentators do not consider HIV antibody testing a usual procedure. Eickhoff, 
Hospital Policies on HIV Antibody Testing, 259 J. A.M.A. 1861 (1988) (editorial). "[U]ntil the 
civil rights issues, which are tragically real, are adequately addressed by society, they will re-
main of major concern and essentially mandate individual informed consent by the patient to be 
tested. Ultimately, one hopes that an HIV antibody test may be ordered, on appropriate indica· 
tion, by physicians in the same way that any other medical diagnostic test may be ordered, but 
that is unlikely to be the case for years yet to come." Id. 
Donald Francis, AIDS advisor to the CDC said that the HIV antibody test "is not like any 
other test .... Can you think of any other test in which children's houses are burned down 
because they have a positive test?" Staver, CMA Vetoes Restrictive AIDS Related Proposals, Am. 
Med. News, Mar. 5, 1988, at 1, 30. 
94. The Presidential Commission on the HIV epidemic noted that discrimination against 
persons with HIV "is impairing this nation's ability to limit the spread of the epidemic." Unless 
the discrimination is limited, it will be difficult to collect epidemiological data and implement 
various health strategies. PRESIDENTIAL AIDS COMMISSION, supra note 82, at 119; see also 
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tection from discrimination under federal and some state laws, this protection 
is not adequate.95 Many such laws do not apply to housing, health insurance, 
access to nonemergency health care, or employers with small workforces.96 
Further, the social stigma and economic harm often result from vlillful or 
negligent disclosure of a person's mv antibody status. Currently, no federal 
law, and few state laws, provide adequate confidentiality guarantees for HIV 
test results.97 Finally, as mentioned previously, HIV-infected women may be 
Chalk v. United States Dist Ct, 840 F.2d 701, modifying 832 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (unani-
mous court ordered injunctive relief for a high school special education teacher with AIDS who 
was denied a classroom teaching assignment); Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting 
or Ove"eaching?, 100 HAR.v. L. REv. 1782 (1987). A positive test result may have another 
severe. even fatal, consequence because of the intensity of emotional responses upon learning of 
a positive test result About half of the AIDS-related suicides occurred in black or Latino 
patients. Thus the importance of informed consent and counseling in conjunction with HIV 
screening programs cannot be over-emphasized. Glass, AIDS and Suicide, 259 J. A.M.A. 1369 
(1988) (editorial). However, women with AIDS seem less likely than men to commit suicide. 
Marzuk, Tierney, Tardiff, Gross, Morgan, Hsu & Mann, Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons 
with AIDS, 259 J. A.M.A. 1333, 1336 (1988). 
95. PRESIDENTIAL AIDS CoMMISSION, supra note 82, at 119. Seveml fedemllmvs pro-
hibit discrimination against the disabled, and HIV is considered a handicapping condition. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act [hereinafter ADA] will greatly increase protection against dis-
crimination because it is not limited to recipients of federal monies. Pub. L No. 101-336, 
§§ 101(5), 301(7), 401(a), 104 Stat 327, 330, 354, 359, 366 (1990). Nevertheless, the ADA 
cannot be used against employers until July 1992. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 337. 
The ADA does not apply to any public accommodation until January 1992 and will not apply 
to the smallest public accommodations until July 1994. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 310, 104 Stat. 
365. In the meantime. existing federal law only applies to recipients of federal monies. The 
private sector is free to discriminate unless prohibited by state law from doing so. More than 
half of the states prohibit discrimination against the disabled; many of these states' lav.'S cover 
HIV-infected individuals. Science Pane~ D.C Group Oppose AIDS Discrimination, REP. ON 
DISABILITY PROGRAMS, Jan. 26, 1989, at 13. The major weakness of fedeml dis:lbility and 
antidiscrimination law is that it only applies to programs receiving fedeml financial assistance 
and "does not significantly extend into the private sector." Gostin, supra note 30, at 1628. The 
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 extends protection to the disabled, "so that private 
landlords and owners may no longer discriminate against people infected with HIV." I d. All 
the states and the District of Columbia provide some protection for the disabled, and 34 states 
formally or informally recognize HIV infection as a disability. Id. Nevertheless the scope of 
the protection is uneven. 
96. PRESIDENTIAL AIDS CoMMISSION, supra note 82, at 119. Until the ADA becomes 
effective. existing federal law covers recipients of federal funds who have at least 15 employees. 
The extent to which antidiscrimination law protects HIV-infected individuals seeking public or 
private housing is unclear. No federal law and few state laws require health care facilities to 
treat HIV-infected individuals in nonemergency situations. Under the ADA, health care prov-
iders and hospitals are consiqered places of public accommodation and they will not be able to 
discriminate in providing services to persons infected with HIV. However, private remedies 
under the ADA are limited to injunctive relief. Americans With Disabilities Act, Pub. L No. 
101-336, § 301(7)(F), 104 Stat 327, 354 (1990). Insurance companies are free to deny health 
care coverage. See generally Dickens, Legal Rights and Duties in the AIDS Epidemic, 239 SCI-
ENCE 580 (1988). 
97. PRESIDENTIAL AIDS CoMMISSION, supra note 82, at 119-20. Although most state 
public health laws have confidentiality provisions, these provisions usually apply only to sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. A small number of states have enacted HIV or AIDS specific confi-
dentiality provisions but the degree of protection varies greatly. There is no federal regulation 
that specifically insures confidentiality of HIV antibody test results. Om trolling AIDS, supra 
note 17, at 46-47. 
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coerced or directed to abort if pregnant or to be sterilized if of childbearing 
age. 
Routine HIV prenatal screening is apt to occur in a public setting because 
the public facilities are more likely to have large numbers of patients at risk. 
Poor women of color, because of their limited access to adequate health care, 
are more likely to use these facilities than to seek private health care, and thus 
a policy of routine HIV screening is more likely to disproportionately affect 
poor women of color. If routine HIV prenatal screening causes many poor 
women of color to avoid prenatal medical care, health risks to both mother 
and fetus will increase,98 aggravating the high infant mortality rates in urban 
communities of color.99 Therefore, the benefits of routine HIV prenatal 
screening (i.e., knowledge that one is infected) are outweighed by the negative 
consequences (avoidance of prenatal care, forced or coerced sterilization or 
abortion, economic harm, and social stigma). 
B. Directive Counseling 
1. In General 
There is some division over the role of counseling in genetic screening.100 
Some genetic counselors argue that the only valid purpose for counseling is to 
benefit society by reducing the "genetic load." Under this view, counseling 
the family is secondary to the goals of directive counseling.101 
A few of these geneticists contend that persons with genetic trait abnor-
malities should have no right to bear children. 102 They argue that society has 
98. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop opposes mandatory prenatal screening be· 
cause he fears it would cut down on access to prenatal care for women. Patton, Resistance and 
the Erotic: Reclaiming History, Setting Strategy as We Face AIDS, RADICAL AM., Nov.-Dec. 
1986, at 68, 78. 
99. For example, less than 50% of Puerto Rican mothers in the United States received 
prenatal care in their first trimester and 10% received no prenatal care prior to delivery. Worth 
& Rodriquez, Latina Women and AIDS, RADICAL AM., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 63, 65. The 14th 
annual report of the nation's health status, Health United States 1989, reported that while infant 
mortality rates improved slightly in 1988, the rate for African-American infants was more than 
twice that for white infants. Further, only 61% of African-American mothers compared to 
79% of white mothers received prenatal care during the first three months of pregnancy. 
Health Data Show Wide Gap Between Whites and Blacks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at A17, 
col. 1. In addition, during the past decade the number of pregnant women who received either 
no prenatal care or care late in their pregnancy increased dramatically. Infant Deaths, Wash. 
Post, Mar. 13, 1990, at A24, col. 1 (editorial). 
100. Note, supra note 71, at 908 (citing Lappe, The Genetic Counselor: Responsible to 
Whom?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept. 1971, at 6). 
101. Id. 
102. Responding to the remarks of noted geneticist Professor Hermann Mueller, Francis 
Clark, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, said in 1962 that there should be no right to have 
children, especially for persons with genetic problems. G. GREER, supra note 43, at 342 (citing 
G. WOLSfENHOLME, MAN AND HIS FUTURE 259 (1963)). More recently another commenta· 
tor remarked: "Perhaps world conditions have become so complex and resources so valuable 
that society now has a compelling interest in restricting reproduction by those who, although 
not (manifestly unfit) themselves, perpetuate human suffering by giving birth to genetically de· 
fective offspring." Smith, supra note 64, at 446-47. 
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an interest in prohibiting people with genetic disorders or conditions from per-
petuating human suffering by giving birth to children who are genetically "de-
fective."103 In fact, directive genetic counseling was used by some geneticists 
in the early part of this century to eugenic advantage. 104 Specifically, these 
geneticists used directive counseling to reduce the incidence of genetic disease 
in the general population. They actively advocated the sterilization of those 
deemed "genetically unfit"; women of color were included in this category.10s 
The advice offered by a counselor doing directive genetic counseling de-
pends on the extent of the risk. There are three categories of genetic risks: (1) 
random risk where the chance of transmission of the genetic condition is no 
greater than the risk for any population, (2) high risk where the chance of 
transmission is at least one in ten and more often one in four, and (3) moder-
ate risk where the chance of transmission is less than one in ten, but greater 
than one in thirty.106 Most couples involved in genetic counseling accept 
moderate risks and avoid high ones. 107 Some prospective parents choose to 
abort the fetus when provided negative information while others will not. 103 
Other genetic counselors argue that personal counseling of the family 
about the genetic risks of childbearing is the only valid purpose of screen-
ing. 109 These individuals favor nondirective counseling. They argue that a 
genetic counselor has no right to tell a woman or couple not to have a child, 
even where the risk of transmitting a serious genetic disorder or congenital 
defect is great.U0 This approach is currently favored by most genetic 
counselors. 111 
Nondirective counseling has been challenged as inconsistent with tradi-
tional medical practice where physicians are more likely to suggest the prefer-
able course of action. 112 Further, some geneticists argue that directive 
counseling against childbearing is sometimes appropriate, for example, where 
one or more potential parent carries the Huntington's gene (a progressive, fa-
tal neurological deterioration). 113 
The real problem with genetic counseling is that the counselor bas di-
vided loyalties. It may be difficult for the counselor to decide whether the 
primary duty is owed to the prospective parents, the fetus, or society.114 This 
103. Smith, supra note 64, at 446-47. 
104. D. KEVLES, supra note 37, at 257-58. 
105. Smith, supra note 64, at 446-47. 
106. Peters & Fmeberg. Genetic Counseling and Screening, TRIAL, Jan. 1984, at 82, 83. 
107. Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 121 n.162 
(1974). 
108. D. KEVLES, supra note 37, at 257. However, "[w]hen couples abort a fetus after 
discovering that it has a birth defect, they have often suffered severe guilt reactions, termination 
of sexual relations, and even divorce." I d. at 298. 
109. Note. supra note 71, at 908. 
110. D. KEVLES, supra note 37, at 257-58. 
111. Id. 
112. SCREENING AND CoUNSELING FOR GENETIC CoNDmONS, supra note 17, at 37-38. 
113. Id. at 38-39. 
114. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 19 CoLUM. L. REv. 618, 645 (1979); 
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argument has relevance today since it is possible that babies born with genetic 
defects might have a cause of action against a genetic counselor (wrongful life/ 
birth) for not being more directive. 115 A similar action might lie against a 
woman who either refused genetic counseling when she had reason to suspect 
a genetic condition or who refused to follow the directions of the genetic coun-
selor after screening.U6 
2. HIV Directive Counseling 
Some health care officials say that HIV-infected women should be 
strongly encouraged not to become pregnant, or, if pregnant, to consider abor-
tion. 117 Concern for the health of the woman was one reason initially given 
for this approach. Early reports expressed concern that pregnancy accelerated 
the progression of the disease, but today there is little evidence that pregnancy 
will enhance the progression of the disease. 118 In addition, no information is 
available on the impact of abortion during the first or second trimester on 
progression of HIV or AIDS. 119 
HIV infection is presumed to be fatal, but there are several genetic condi-
tions that may result in serious medical problems and even death. 120 No man-
dates are present for abortion for these genetic conditions. The only major 
difference between HIV infection and a serious genetic condition is that HIV 
may also be transmitted sexually. 121 Since HIV is a mildly communicable dis-
ease whose perinatal transmission impinges on reproductive freedom, the cau-
Comment, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1291 n.51 (1983) 
(citing P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 156 (1977)). 
115. The argument would be that the counselor breached a medical duty of care owed the 
fetus for not acting reasonably and leaving it up to the child's stupid or irrational parents who 
predictably brought the child into the world. 
116. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, 
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 448-49 (1983). Dialogue among scholars over fetal rights 
has increased the significance of the right of pregnant women to refuse treatment designed to 
benefit the fetus or to engage in conduct which may be harmful to the fetus. See, e.g., Goldberg, 
Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is It Anyway, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 591 
(1989); Johnsen, From Driving to Drogs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives 
After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1989) [hereinafter From Driving to Drugs]; Johnsen, 
The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, 
and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A 
Call for a Thoughtful Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REv. 377 (1990). 
117. Donovan, AIDS and Family Planning Clinics: Confronting the Crisis, 19 PAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 111, 113 (1987). 
118. See supra note 89. 
119. Minkoff, supra note 26, at 2714. 
120. Polycystic Kidney Disease, a fatal hereditary disease, is an example. Peters & 
Fineberg, supra note 106, at 84. 
121. "Society has been much more willing to limit individual freedom in the service of 
protecting people from certain communicable diseases ... than from equally serious genetic 
diseases. This difference occurs in part because the likelihood of transmission is often less cer-
tain in the case of genetic disease and because genetic transmission occurs within the family, 
rather than the public at large. But more fundamentally, it reflects the facts that the prevention 
of genetic disease can impinge on reproductive freedom .... " SCREENING AND COUNSELING 
FOR GENETIC CONDmONS, supra note 17, at 47-53. 
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tion exercised for regulation of genetic diseases should also apply for efforts to 
stem the perinatal transmission ofHIV. Assuming the concern here is provid-
ing the woman with the information needed to make an informed decision 
about bearing a child, there is no reason to treat HIV-infected women of 
childbearing age differently from women with serious genetic conditions. 
Directive counseling of HIV-infected women may be coercive to some 
women and ineffective for others. Various studies indicate that some HIV-
infected pregnant women are choosing to continue their pregnancies. One 
study at the State University of New York Health Center in Brooluyn found 
that eighteen out of sixty HIV-infected women received their test results in 
time to abort, yet only three chose abortion. 122 In addition, ten of the sixty 
women became pregnant a second time. 123 The same pattern was found in 
Miami, the Bronx, ~d Harlem. 124 
A more recent longitudinal study of women intravenous drug users in 
New York City found that 50% ofHIV-infected women compared to 44% of 
uninfected women chose to terminate their pregnancies before twenty-four 
weeks' gestation. 125 The researchers characterized their counseling as "sup-
portive and nondirective."126 Forty-three percent of the HIV-infected women 
knew of their status prior to becoming pregnant, and 67% of those women 
terminated their pregnancy. 127 By comparison, 58% of the women who knew 
they were seronegative subsequently became pregnant, and 57% of these preg-
nant women terminated their pregnancies. 128 
The reasons why some HIV-infected women become pregnant and choose 
to continue their pregnancy are complicated. In the same longitudinal study 
researchers found that women who had a prior history of abortion were more 
likely to terminate their pregnancy. 129 Significantly, neither the threat of per-
inatal transmission of HIV nor concern about developing AIDS during the 
pregnancy was a determining factor in the decision to terminate pregnancy. 130 
"Seropositives who chose to continue their pregnancies cited the desire for a 
child and religious beliefs as the most important reasons for their choices."131 
Even though the research findings are limited to intravenous drug users, the 
researchers conclude that sensitive and supportive counseling is of critical im-
portance for HIV-infected women, for whom the element of HIV infection 
might be seen as only one aspect of a complex pattern of values, culture, and 
behavior.132 Knowledge that one is infected with HIV alone is not sufficient to 
122. Abraham, supra note 53, at 3. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status, supra note 83, at 3568. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (71% compared to 38% of women not reporting prior elective abortion). 
130. Id. at 3569. 
131. Id. at 3570. 
132. Id. Psychologists Vickie Mays and Susan Cochran note the critical need for public 
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reduce the transmission of the virus perinatally. 
While the government's interest in stopping the spread of AIDS and HIV 
infection is significant, that interest does not warrant routine HIV prenatal 
screening of "high risk" women or directed counseling of infected women. 
Further, routine screening and counseling should not be implemented without 
stringent procedural safeguards. In addition to equal protection concerns, a 
woman's right to privacy is violated by routine HIV screening without written 
informed consent or pre-test counseling, and by directive counseling. The 
choice whether or not to bear a child should be made by each woman, not by 
the government. Less intrusive means for satisfying the government's interest 
are available. 
v. 
PRIVACY PROTECTION 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma the Supreme Court recognized that the right to 
procreate is fundamental and that efforts by the government to sterilize indi-
viduals will be strictly scrutinized. 133 Two later decisions, Griswold v. Con-
necticut 134 and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 135 recognized the right of the individual to 
decide whether to bear a child. Subsequently, in Roe v. Wade, the Court ex-
tended this fundamental right to include the right of a woman to choose an 
abortion. 136 Any government action that literally proscribes either choice -
sterilization versus pregnancy or pregnancy versus abortion - is constitution-
ally suspect. 
The Court in Roe recognized that the fundamental right to an abortion is 
not absolute. 137 Similarly, the Court in Skinner recognized that the right to 
procreate is not absolute. 138 However, in general, the Court has recognized 
health officials to understand the importance of race and culture in fighting HIV within nll 
segments of the Mrican-American community. Mays & Cochran, Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome and Black Americans: Special Psychosocial Issues, 102 PUB. HEALTH REP. 224 
(1987); accord Dalton, AIDS in Blackface, 1989 DAEDALUS 205. More recently, Mays and 
Cochran suggest that HIV prenatal screening and counseling programs often fail "to be sensi-
tive to the special value of children for Black and Latina women. Much psychologicnl research 
has centered on parents' socioemotional and individualistic reasons for bearing and nurturinB 
children .... [Planners must realize that culturally] [t]he ability to reproduce was seen as a 
powerful tool in the fight for liberation." Mays & Cochran, Issues in the Perception of AIDS 
Risk and Risk Reduction Activities by Black and Hispanic/Latina Women, 43 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 949, 953 (1988). Researchers at the Multicultural Inquiry and Research on AIDS Project 
connected with the University of California at San Francisco's Center for AIDS Prevention 
Studies also note that, in order for HIV prevention programs to work in the African-American 
community, we need to recognize the existing cultural values which impact on mnle-femnle 
sexual relationships. M. Fullilove, R. Fullilove, Haynes & Gross, Black Women and AIDS 
Prevention: A View Towards Understanding the Gender Rules, 21 J. SEX REs. 47, 48 (1990). 
133. 316 u.s. 535, 541 (1942). 
134. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married couples). 
135. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried persons). 
136. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
137. /d. at 154. 
138. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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that the state may not unduly burden either right unless it can demonstrate 
some compelling interest. 139 As this Article has discussed, the state arguably 
has a compelling interest in preventing the spread of a mildly contagious, but 
often fatal, disease, HIV, especially when the possible target of infection is a 
newborn child. Thus, at issue is whether a program of routine HIV prenatal 
screening is the appropriate means to accomplish this compelling state 
interest. 
Routine HIV prenatal screening, when conducted by the government, 
constitutes an undue burden on an infected woman's procreational choices. 140 
In essence, the only reason for the HIV prenatal screening is to identify preg-
nant women infected with HIV and to counsel them to abort or submit to 
medical treatment. This policy effectively denies HIV-infected pregnant wo-
men bodily autonomy over the choice of continuing their pregnancy or abort-
ing the fetus. 
The state may argue that absent termination of pregnancy or compelled 
medical treatment, the government will not be able to protect the health of 
potential life, an objective that at least three members on the current Supreme 
Court have recognized as a "permissible" governmental interest.141 Addition-
ally, the government may raise the financial argument that absent these meas-
ures it will be forced to provide costly care for seriously ill newborns and 
139. The exact standard to be applied in these cases is unclear in light of the Court's recent 
decisions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), and Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). In prior cases, the Court regularly applied a standard 
first ~t out in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), which interpreted the constitutionnl right 
protected in Roe as a woman's fundamental right to be free only "from unduly burdensome 
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Maher v. R~ 
432 U.S. at 474. However, the Court has applied this standard inconsistently. See, e.g., Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking 
down a statute requiring the presence of a second physician because it lacked an emergency 
clause); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft. 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (up-
holding a state law requiring the presence of a second physician at an abortion); City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down a statute 
requiring hospitalization for second trimester abortions). 
In Webster, a majority appeared to apply the Maher standard, holding that restrictions on 
the use of public employees and facilities for nontherapeutic abortions place "no governmental 
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy." 109 S. Ct. at 3042 
(quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)). However, a plurality of the Court then 
expressly rejected the Roe trimester framework in order to rule that a state statute requiring 
certain "necessary" viability tests need only be reasonably designed to further legitimate state 
interests. Id. at 3058. The dissent appropriately termed this a "dressed up rational basis stan-
dard." Id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the statute could 
have been upheld under the Maher standard and that, therefore, the plurality should not have 
reconsidered Roe. Id. at 3060 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
140. There is a raging debate at the CDC about the content of the guidelines to prevent 
perinatal transmission ofHIV. A key concern is whether elective abortion should be mentioned 
as an option when counseling HIV-positive women. See, e.g., Grimes, The CDC and Abortion 
in HIV-Positive Women, 259 J. A.l\1.A. 1176 (1987); Gunn, The CDC and Abortion in HIV-
Positive Women, 259 J. A.M.A. 217 (1988) (reply to Grimes). 
141. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057. For a general discussion of the implications of Web-
ster, see Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. R.Ev. 105 (1989). 
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orphan children. However, financial arguments alone cannot be allowed to 
override a fundamental right, and, even when coupled with some interest in 
protecting potential life, there is little evidence that routine HIV prenatal 
screening of pregnant women is sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve these 
purposes. 
Even voluntary HIV prenatal testing, when coupled with directive coun-
seling by the government, raises serious privacy concerns. Directive counsel-
ing may be coercive if abortion or sterilization is perceived by poor women as 
a condition for receiving medical care. 142 Further, the threat of compelled 
medical treatment should she continue her pregnancy may leave an infected 
woman feeling she has no control over her body or her reproductive choices, 
so that any decision is not truly voluntary. 
Prior to Webster, the Supreme Court invalidated state laws that substan-
tially discouraged or dissuaded women from exercising their right to choose 
between terminating or continuing pregnancy. 143 Following Roe v. Wade, 
some states tried to interfere with this choice by enacting so-called informed 
consent laws. 144 Other states tried to impose waiting periods before a woman 
could voluntarily terminate her pregnancy.145 A majority of the Court viewed 
these state laws as impermissible interferences with the right of a woman to 
control the reproductive aspects of her body. 
For pregnant women infected with HIV, directive counseling to abort is 
analogous to those state laws. Even in light of Webster, the government can-
not claim that directive counseling furthers the government's interest in pro-
tecting potential life, because the objective of the counseling, in the case of an 
already pregnant woman, is the destruction of the fetus. 
The privacy cases dealing with reproductive rights can be bifurcated. In 
one set of cases, the Court protects the right of individual choice prior to 
conception (Skinner, Griswold, and Eisenstadt). In the second set of cases the 
Court is protecting that right after conception (Roe, Akron, Thornburgh, and 
Webster). Once a woman has affirmatively exercised the right to procreate, 
142. See Sullivan, supra note 92. 
143. The Court in Roe did not prevent states from regulating abortions. See supra note 
139. However when these regulations apply to pre-viability abortions, the state must demon· 
strate some compelling interest in protecting maternal health and the regulation must be nar-
rowly tailored. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
427 (1983). For example, the Court has struck down laws that require all pre-viability abor-
tions be performed in licensed hospitals. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Court has 
upheld certain minor regulations, including laws requiring that the abortionist be a licensed 
physician, Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam), or that hospitals keeps accu· 
rate records of abortions performed, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52 (1976). 
144. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. 416, where the attending physician was required to explain 
in graphic detail the development of the fetus, various abortion techniques, and potential emo· 
tional complications. But cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, in 
which the Court upheld the requirement that a standard medical consent form be executed by 
the woman seeking an abortion. 
145. See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. 416. 
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governmental interference becomes more personal and invasive. Thus, as pre-
viously stated, it should be more difficult for the government to establish a 
sufficiently compelling interest in directive counseling to abort or to claim that 
the counseling process is sufficiently narrowly tailored to justify interfering 
with a woman's procreational choices. Since the risk that a mother will trans-
mit mv is estimated to be between thirty and fifty percent and since the wo-
men most often counseled are women of color, a court should find directive 
counseling not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the stated goal of 
preventing perinatal transmission of HIV. Unlike the regulations challenged 
unsuccessfully in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Inc., 146 the state is 
not encouraging potential life, but is trying to prevent it through forced abor-
tion or sterilization. Following this line of reasoning, directive counseling of 
HIV-infected women of childbearing age impermissibly interferes with 
procreational choices. Thus, counseling should be closely regulated to ensure 
protection of women's procreational rights. 
Both the abortion and sterilization issues involve the right of a woman to 
control the reproductive aspects of her body. While the government has an 
interest in protecting the woman's health in each instance, the government 
conceivably has no compelling interest in sterilizing a woman against her will 
or in forcing her to abort. 147 A government policy which advocates steriliza-
tion through directive counseling of fertile HIV-infected women or abortion 
for pregnant women infected with mv is precisely the kind of interference 
with private decision making that Skinner and Roe attempt to prevent. Direc-
tive counseling raises the specter of an Orwellian nightmare, prohibited not 
only by the substantive due process right to privacy found in the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments, but also by the "liberty of conscience" concept that 
underlies the first amendment. 148 Thus, government instituted or sanctioned 
routine mv screening and directive counseling programs would conflict with 
the spatial and decision making spheres of privacy that the federal Constitu-
tion guarantees. 
If directive counseling is permitted for pregnant women with HIV, then 
the door is open for other governmental restrictions on women's reproductive 
rights, arguably in the name of maternal or fetal health. There are already a 
few cases of court-ordered, forced prenatal invasions. 149 Therefore, HIV 
146. 109 s. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
147. At least one commentator disagrees and suggests that "the state's interest in improv-
ing the quality of a population's gene pool in order to minimize suffering, to reduce the number 
of economically dependent persons, and possibly, to save mankind from extinction arguably 
justifies the infringement of individuals' civil liberties." Smith, supra note 64, at 443 (citing 
Vickowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World- Legal, Ethical and Soda/ Issues of Eugen-
ics, 1971 U. ILL L.F. 189, 208). As long as any people advocate eugenics, the courts must 
closely monitor government policies with eugenic overtones. 
148. See generally M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1985); D. RICHARDS, TOLERA-
TION AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1986). 
149. Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Inten·entions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 
HARv. WOMEN's LJ. 9, 48 n.203 (1987) [hereinafter Prenatal Im·asions]. A recent study of 
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counseling of pregnant women and women of childbearing age done with fed-
eral or state funds must be conditioned on a guarantee to do nondirective 
counseling and be accompanied by stringent reporting requirements and 
monitoring. 150 
HIV -infected women who exercise their right to conceive and bear chil· 
dren must be supported. Many HIV -infected women may have no health care 
insurance because they are unemployed or marginally employed.151 HIV-in-
fected women often have a long history of poor health prior to diagnosis. 152 
For the right to choose to have any meaning, HIV -infected pregnant women 
must have access to appropriate health care. To do otherwise not only makes 
the principles of Skinner and Roe v. Wade meaningless for infected women, 
but calls into question the rationale for HIV prenatal screening and 
counseling. 
Women who choose not to continue their pregnancies also must be sup-
ported. However, according to the Supreme Court, a woman's constitutional 
right to control the reproductive aspects of her body does not include an abor-
tion paid for by government. 153 This is true even if the policy effectively 
operates to deny poor women access to abortion, be it therapeutic or non-
therapeutic. 154 Thus, abortion may not be a financial option for poor women 
of color. Since Webster, a dwindling number of states provide funds for abor-
physician and hospital court-ordered obstetrical intervention found that 81% of the women 
involved were black, Asian, or Hispanic. All the women were treated in teaching-hospital clin· 
ics or were receiving public assistance. Court-ordered intervention occurred in 86% of the 
cases. Koldei, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NBW ENG. J. 
MED. 1192, 1192 {1987). 
These forced invasions fall into two general categories, forced cesareans and forced treat· 
ment. Unfortunately, most of the forced cesarean cases are unreported. Prenatal Invasions, 
supra, at 11-12 & n.16. Some of the reported cases include: In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 
1987), vacated and remanded/or reh'g en bane, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988); Jefferson v. Griffin 
Spalding City Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 {1981). Examples of forced treatment include: 
Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 985 
(1964); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006,491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (forced blood 
transfusion). But cf. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983) (refusing to order 
surgery on pregnant woman to prevent probable miscarriage). For an excellent argument 
against compelled treatment of pregnant women, see Annas, Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant 
Patients, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1213 {1987). 
150. Any public health program which undertakes directive counseling in the reproductive 
arena, absent specific legislative authorization, would undoubtedly be an arbitrary and capri· 
cious use of administrative authority in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551 (1988). Unfortunately, such an argument is beyond the scope of this Article. 
151. Staver, Minority Women Grappling with Growing AIDS Problem, Am. Med. News, 
Nov. 6, 1987, at 43. In 1985, a federal task force on black and minority health found thnt twice 
as many blacks and three times as many Hispanics as whites have no medical insurance. RB· 
PORT ON MINORITY HEALTH, supra note 1, at 17-18. 
152. Staver, supra note 151, at 43. 
153. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
438 {1977). 
154. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315 (therapeutic); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 (non· 
therapeutic). 
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tion under Medicaid.155 Ironically, federally funded sterilizations remain free 
on demand. 156 If abortion is not a viable option for poor women of color, 
there is little reason for routine prenatal HIV screening. Therefore, if routine 
HIV prenatal screening is implemented, both federal and state governments 
need to reexamine their stance on publicly funded abortion. 157 
VI. 
ADDmONAL LEGAL IssUES 
A. Screening and Counseling 
Several legal issues need to be addressed which are beyond the scope of 
this Article. For example, while the right to privacy also applies to minors, 158 
"states have a 'significant' interest in supporting certain abortion regulations 
aimed at protecting children that is not present when the state seeks to regu-
late adults."159 Several states allow minors to consent to testing and treatment 
of sexually transmitted disease and to prenatal treatment. 160 One question is 
whether HIV screening of a minor female would be included within the statu-
tory definition of sexually transmitted disease or prenatal care in the case of 
pregnant minors, and thus be exempt from parental notification require-
ments. 161 This is important since AIDS is usually not classified as a venereal 
155. Brotman, Mixed Emotions, Jumbled Laws in Wake of Webster, States to Vary More 
on Abortion Statutes, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1990, at 1 (noting that 37 states have pl.SSed 
laws forbidding the use of Medicaid funds for abortion in almost all circumstances since the 
passage of the Hyde Amendment, which took effect in 1977). 
156. "By 1977 the passage of the Hyde Amendment in Congress had mandated the v..ith-
drawal of federal funding for abortions, causing many state legislatures to follow suit ••• Since 
surgical sterilizations, funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, remained 
free on demand, more and more poor women have been forced to opt for permanent infertility." 
A. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLAss 206 (1981). 
157. Even where public or private funding for abortion is available to HIV-infected preg-
nant women, there is still the issue of health care providers refusing to perform abortions on 
these women. Donovan, supra note 117. A recent study of abortion clinics in New York City 
found that two-thirds refuse to treat women infected with HIV. Zarembka & Franke, Women 
in the AIDS Epidemic: A Portrait of Unmet Needs, 9 ST. LoUIS U. Pus. L. REV. 519, 525 
(1990). 
158. Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977); Planned Parenthood of 
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
159. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1466 (8th Cir. 1988), o.ff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2925 
(1990) (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 
(1983)). The Minnesota law upheld in Hodgson requires minors who want an abortion to notify 
both parents or obtain special permission from a judge. This provision applies even where the 
minor's parents are divorced or separated or have deserted the minor. It is the most restrictive 
notification law in the country. 110 S. Ct. at 2932. 
160. lllinois, Minnesota, Nevada, and Utah all allow minors to consent to be tested and 
treated for sexually transmitted diseases, prenatal care, and medical care for the minor's child 
without parental consent or notice. ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, PARENTAL 
NOTICE LAWS 31 nn.60.61, 32 n.63 (1986) [hereinafter PARENTAL NOTICE LAws]. 
161. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990). Prior to the 
Supreme Court's decisions in the Ohio and Minnesota parental notice/consent cases decided 
last term, 21 states had parental notice or consent laws on the books but did not enforce them; 
13 states had statutes in effect; and 16 states had no restrictions on minor women. Brotman, 
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or sexually transmitted disease. 162 
Even if parental consent is not required for HIV screening, some health 
care providers may feel obligated to inform the minor's parents if the test 
results are positive, especially if the minor is also pregnant. The legal rights of 
minor females and the legal and ethical obligations of health care providers in 
this area are unclear. 
Another issue is whether the fourth amendment protection from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures could be used to successfully challenge compul-
sory HIV prenatal screening proposals directed at women of color. Some 
commentators are doubtful that courts would strike down compulsory HIV 
screening proposals. 163 However, the focus of these discussions is on men 
rather than on pregnant women or fertile women who also are people of color. 
The issue may well be different when the focus is on women because procrea-
tional rights and race are also involved. 
Another legal concern is the extent of legal protection afforded women's 
procreational rights under federal law. While the recently enacted Americans 
with Disabilities Act [hereinafter ADA] extends coverage to privately oper-
ated places of public accommodation, 164 the ADA denies monetary damages 
to private litigants. 165 On the other hand, some courts have granted compen-
satory damages under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.166 This law prohibits 
supra note 155. For further information on states, see PARENTAL NOTICE LAWS, supra note 
160, at 29 n.1 (1986). Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 
(1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); 
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (requirement that 
minors obtain either parental consent to abortion or judicial consultation following parental 
consultation invalid); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
(right of mature minor to abortion without parent's consent). 
162. There are several reasons why some states are reluctant to classify AIDS or HIV 
infection as a sexually transmitted rather than a communicable disease. First, most sexually 
transmitted disease laws permit unconsented testing whenever there is reasonable cause to sus· 
pect an infection. Second, those laws also allow other restrictive or invasive measures such as 
quarantine, and mandatory reporting and contact tracing, all measures which public health 
officials fear might discourage people at high risk from seeking HIV testing. Lewin, A State 
Judge in New York Refuses to Declare AIDS a Sexually Transmitted Disease, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
16, 1988, B1, col. 3, B6, col. 6 (late ed.). 
163. See, e.g., Note, Mandatory Testing of Public Employees for the Human Immu· 
nodeficiency Virus: The Fourth Amendment and Medical Reasonableness, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
720 (1990); Richards, Communicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach to 
AIDS, 65 DEN. U.L. REv. 127, 143 (1988); Note, AIDS: Legal Issues in Search of a Cure, 14 
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 575, 617 (1988) (providing government demonstrates the epidemic is 
endangering public health or draining financial resources); Note, The Constitutional Rights of 
AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1274, 1287 (1986) (if shown to be necessary to advance 
public health). 
164. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 301(7), 104 Stat. 327, 354 (1990). 
165. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 308(a), 104 Stat. 327, 363 (1990). 
166. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Courts generally agree that damages are 
available under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 
n.24 (1984) (noting, but expressing no opinion on, the availability of damages under § 504); 
Martin H. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1983); Micner v. 
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982). 
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discrimination against the handicapped by recipients of federal funds. Most 
hospitals and many health care providers receive federal funds, including 
Medicaid payments. Persons infected with HIV are covered by the Rehabili-
tation Act. 167 
B. Additional Legal Issues for Women 
Unfortunately, routine HIV screening of women may result in loss of 
child custody for infected women. Many public hospitals in urban areas are 
routinely testing pregnant women for illicit drugs. 168 Women vJ:ith positive 
drug tests are often reported to child protective services, forcing these women 
to prove to government that they are fit mothers. 169 Thus it is conceivable 
that similar policies may be imposed on women with HIV. 
In addition, there is also the possibility that women who become preg-
nant after learning of their antibody status will be prosecuted criminally if 
their children are born infected with HIV. 17° Finally, the infected children 
might be able to bring civil suits against their mothers for the willful or negli-
gent transmission of HIV. 171 
CONCLUSION 
There is a compelling need for federal legislation which recognizes the 
race, class, and privacy issues involved in routine HIV prenatal screening and 
167. In the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress amended sections 503 and 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act to include persons with contagious diseases and infections. Pub. L. 
No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 31 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 1989)). 
168. Franke, Turning Issues Upside Down, in AIDS: THE WOMEN 226, 228 (1. Rieder & 
P. Ruppelt eds. 1988). For a discussion of the issues involved, see Robin-Vergeer, The Problem 
of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled Interwntion, 42 STAN. L. REv. 745 
(1980) (opposing maternal drug screening). 
169. Franke, supra note 168, at 228. A :Michigan state court allowed evidence of a 
mother's drug use during pregnancy to be used as proof of neglect or abuse in a state-initiated 
proceeding to deprive her of custody of her new born child. In re Baby X, 97 l\1ich. App. Ill, 
293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). 
170. Franke, supra note 168, at 228. Lynn Paltrow, a lawyer with the American Civil 
Liberties Union's Reproductive Freedom Project, notes that there is a racial bias in the prosecu-
tion of pregnant drug addicts. Specifically, despite relatively equal number of white women and 
women of color who are drug users, poor women and/or women of color are more likely to be 
prosecuted because "public hospitals, where poor women go for care, are most vigilant in their 
drug testing and more likely than private hospitals to report women whose tests show drug 
use." Kolata, Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at Al3, col. 1. 
Ms. Paltrow claims that 80% of all pregnant drug users prosecuted are women of color. There 
is a fear that this discriminatory prosecution will "drive poor women away from prenatal care 
out of fear that a trip to the doctor can end up as a term in jail." Id. 
Recently a woman was criminally prosecuted for delivering drugs to her newborn via the 
umbilical cord moments after birth. State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1989), 
cited in Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 16, 1989, at I, col. 4 (discussing 
ten cases in five different states); From Driving to Drugs, supra note 116, at 208-11 (unsuccessful 
prosecution of Pamela Stewart for child abuse). 
171. Franke, supra note 168, at 230-31. There is some precedent. See Grodin v. Grodin, 
102 Mich App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980) (child sued mother for taking tetracycline during 
pregnancy resulting in discoloration of child's teeth). 
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directive counseling. This legislation would apply to all federal facilities and 
any other facility receiving federal funds and would require that all HIV test-
ing of women of childbearing age be performed with written consent. Consent 
forms must be written in the woman's native language. In order to preserve 
privacy and autonomy, special assistance by a person of the woman's choice 
must be provided for women who are either actually or functionally illiterate. 
In addition, the proposed legislation would prohibit the use of directive 
counseling. 
If mass HIV screening programs are going to be endorsed by the govern-
ment, certain prerequisites must be met. First, there must be community par-
ticipation in the planning and implementation of any HIV screening program 
involving poor women and women of color. Each of these communities has a 
different culture and history that must be taken into account when designing 
mass screening programs. 
Second, pilot projects should precede any mass screening. Pilot programs 
test the feasibility of any mass screening proposal directed at a targeted group 
or area. Pilot projects allow program adjustments to be made quickly and 
minimize risk of harm to the targeted population. 
Third, screening procedures must be adequate. This means that where 
screening is routine, the written informed consent of clients should be ob-
tained and consent forms should be simply written. Furthermore, there 
should be short waiting periods for tests and test results, and adequate coun-
seling both before testing and after the receipt of test results. 
There is some question about what constitutes adequate counseling. 
Without question, adequate counseling includes counselors, who are fluent in 
the women's native language and who, where needed, have had cross-cultural 
training. Adequate counseling may mean that fifteen to thirty minutes with a 
client may not be enough, especially where the client has a positive test result. 
The shock of learning that one has a positive test may negate any attempt to 
counsel on safe sex and other personal matters. Any woman may not fully 
understand the reproductive implications of a positive HIV antibody test after 
only one counseling session. Even where the counselor is nondirective, misin-
formation about the nature of the risk of transmission to sexual partner or 
fetus may have the same effect as directive counseling. Careful monitoring of 
counseling is essential. 
Finally, mass HIV screening programs must adequately protect the 
targeted community. 172 This raises the issue of anonymous versus confidential 
HIV testing. Although several commentators claim that anonymous screen-
ing is more likely to create confidence in those who must be tested, 173 where 
172. Similar recommendations were made for mass genetic screening programs. SCREEN· 
lNG AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS, supra note 17, at 33. 
173. See, e.g., Confronting AIDS, supra note 17, at 124 ("The committee believes that the 
largely undesirable social response to the identification of individuals as being antibody positive 
argues for voluntary, anonymous systems of testing, but this would entail potential loss of cer· 
tain public health benefits."). 
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prolonged counseling is necessary, confidential testing may be more appropri-
ate. Of course, in states which mandate reporting of all positive HIV antibody 
tests, anonymous testing may be more effective until adequate anti-discrimina-
tion and confidentiality provisions are enacted. 
Because the potential for abuse of HIV-infected women's reproductive 
rights is great, the implications of HIV screening programs directed at fertile 
women cannot be ignored. Women currently identified as at greatest risk of 
HIV infection are poor women and/or women of color. Because these women 
are invisible or are considered by some to be less valued members of society, 
the threat to their rights is at risk of being ignored. There is too much at stake 
to allow that to happen. If fertile HIV-infected women lose their right to 
choose, then all women will lose. Our indifference to women infected with 
HIV will have dramatic consequences for future generations of women. At 
the very least some protective legislation must be enacted at the federal and 
state level. 
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